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Sammanfattning 
 
Sofia Hedberg:  
Strategic alliances in the dairy industry – with special reference to Arla Foods.  
Examensarbete från Sveriges Lantbruksuniversitet, Uppsala, 2004.  
 
Konkurrensen på den europeiska mejerimarknaden hårdnar, och företagen måste vara flexibla 
för att klara sig under de allt mer dynamiska förhållanden. Många viktiga marknadsaktörer 
påverkar mejeriföretagen; dagligvaruhandeln koncentreras och internationaliseras mer och 
mer, storkökssektorn växer snabbt och får en allt större roll, konsumentbeteendet ändras och 
framtida revideringar av jordbrukspolitiken kommer att få stora konsekvenser för mejeriernas 
strategier. För att hantera dessa förändringar och samtidigt behålla sina konkurrensfördelar 
kan företagen samarbeta med andra. De senaste fyra åren har de 15 största mejeriföretagen i 
Europa ingått mer än 200 strategiska allianser. I denna uppsats behandlas sex typer av 
allianser, nämligen sammanslagningar, uppköp, joint ventures, delägande, licensavtal och 
generella, ospecificerade samarbeten. Skillnader mellan dessa kan till stor del förklaras av 
olika grader av finansiell och resursmässig integrering. 
 
Syftet med uppsatsen är att utröna vilka möjligheter som finns till alliansbildningar bland 
europeiska mejeriföretag, med fokus på Arla Foods och några av dess huvudkonkurrenter. 
Företag bildar allianser för att komplettera varandras resurser. För att undersöka företagens 
möjligheter till allianser används den s k resursbaserade teorin. Arla Foods, Friesland 
Coberco, Campina (alla tre bondekooperativa) och Danone (börsnoterat aktiebolag), är 
föremål för denna stud ie. De tre kooperativen skiljer sig åt både organisatoriskt och 
finansiellt, och detta har uppenbarligen betydelse för deras respektive val av allianser. 
 
Motiv, strategisk kompatibilitet och resurser i respektive företag är tre viktiga variabler, när 
man undersöker strategiska allianser. Företagen skiljer sig åt rörande dessa variabler. Olika 
typer av motiv kan föranleda allianser, såsom strävan efter internationell expansion, ökad 
marknadsandel på befintliga marknader och en starkare produktportfölj. Motivet har betydelse 
för vilken typ av allians som bör väljas, vilket leder till att företagens strategier påverkar deras 
val av allianstyp. Andra faktorer som påverkar valet ar företagets benägenhet att ta risker och 
och dess förmåga att skaffa finansiella medel. Strategisk överensstämmelse mellan parterna i 
en allians är av stor betydelse om graden av integration är hög, exempelvis vid uppköp och 
sammanslagningar. Vilken typ av resurser som företagen har är av väsentlig vikt. Attraktiva 
resurser attraherar potentiella partners. Det är tydligt att nyckelresursen i de allianser, som 
ingåtts av företagen i denna studie, är finansiella medel.  
 
Arla Foods har en ledande roll bland mejeriföretagen när det gäller strategiska allianser. 
Företaget har initierat flest allianser och har allianser av alla typer. Det skiljer sig från de 
övriga två kooperativen i denna uppsats genom att det inte har något individuellt kapital. 
Friesland Coberco och Campina har kooperativa former, som gör det möjligt för dem att 
skaffa kapital antingen från medlemmarna (Campina) eller från externa investerare (Friesland 
Coberco), vilket möjliggör allianser som kräver stora ekonomiska insatser. Arla Foods har 
huvudsakligen allierat sig genom joint ventures, varvid det utnyttjar sina kompetenser och sin 
starka marknadsposition. Friesland Cobercos och Campinas allianser domineras av uppköp. 
Med andra ord har mejeriföretagens organisationssätt betydelse för deras strategiska allianser.  
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European dairy firms face intensified competition and continuously new challenges raised by 
a more dynamic business environment. Many important market players affect the dairy 
business environment; retailers are subject to structural changes as they are internationalizing 
and consolidating, food service is a fast growing sector, consumer demand is shifting and 
changes in the agricultural policy will influence future strategies. To be able to handle all 
business environmental issues simultaneously firms can benefit from co-operating with 
others. The top 15 dairies in Europe have initiated more than 200 strategic alliances over the 
last four years. In this thesis six types of strategic alliances are accounted for; mergers, 
acquisitions, joint ventures, shares, licensing agreements and general/unspecified co-operating 
agreements. These types differ in terms of financial and resource integration.  
 
The aim of this study is to assess possible choices of alliance formation in the European dairy 
industry with special reference to Arla Foods and a few of its main competitors. Firms embark 
into alliances with the aim of supplementing each other’s set of resources. To examine these 
firms’ possibilities in the strategic alliance activities the resource-based theory is applied. Arla 
Foods, Friesland Coberco, Campina (cooperatives) and Danone (IOF), are subject to this 
study. The three cooperatives have internal disparities when it comes to organizational and 
financial structure, and apparently, this has implications for their respective choices of 
strategic alliances.  
 
Motives, strategic fit and resources held by firms are important variables when examining the 
phenomenon of strategic alliances, and differences can be distinguished between firms 
regarding these factors. Different motives evoke strategic alliances, like international 
expansion, further penetration on markets where the firms are already present and to 
strengthen product portfolios. Different motives advocate different types of alliances, so 
depending on a firm’s strategy different types of alliances are more or less appropriate. Other 
reasons why a firm chooses a certain type of alliance is its ability to take risks and its ability 
to raise necessary financial means. Strategic fit between two allying firms are of substantial 
importance if the level of resource or financial integration is high as in the cases of mergers 
and acquisitions. What kind of resources a firm holds is elementary in these matters. 
Attractive resources send signals to potential partners. Looking at the resources contributed in 
different alliances formed by the firms in this study it is obvious that financial resources are 
the far most important. 
 
Arla Foods has taken a leading role in the strategic alliance activities in the dairy industry, 
forming many alliances utilizing the whole range of alliance types. Arla Foods diverge from 
Friesland Coberco and Campina to the extent that it has no allocated capital (owned 
individually by the members). Friesland Coberco and Campina both have cooperative forms 
that allow them to raise financial means either from members, in Campina’s case, or from 
external investors, in Friesland Coberco’s case, which makes them able to form alliances that 
require substantial financial means. Arla Foods has primarily formed joint ventures, 
capitalizing on its competence and market position, while Friesland Coberco and Campina 
have made several acquisitions, using their financial facilities. So, the organizational mode 
matters when it comes to strategic alliance activities conducted by dairy cooperatives.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
Many external factors affect food-processing firms, for example in the dairy industry. One 
such factor is the agricultural policy. One of the cornerstones of the European Union is the 
”internal market”, based on free movement of goods, persons, services and capital. In 2004 
the union is expanded with ten countries. Big differences between candidates and present 
member countries lead to difficulties in prosecuting the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). 
Today’s CAP aims to increase productivity, stabilise the market, and secure supplies of food 
at reasonable food prices. The enlargement of the union will necessitate a demodulation of 
export supports, boarder protection and direct reimbursement policies. As a likely 
consequence a drop in prices on primary products will occur. This will create problems 
especially for high-cost producers. (http://europa.eu.int/pol/agr/index_sv.htm, 2003-12-15) 
Hence, Arla Foods has promised its members to pay one of the highest milk prices in the EU, 
thereby putting strong pressure on Arla Foods’ management to continuously find new 
competitive business solutions.  
 
Competition is changing as well. Many of the large European dairy firms undergo structural 
changes, for example undertake strategic alliances. Being one of the largest players, Arla 
Foods has taken a leading role in the strategic alliance activities. In the last four years the top 
15 dairies in Europe have initiated more than 200 alliances of different types: acquisitions, 
mergers, equity share holdings, joint ventures, licensing agreements and general/unspecified 
co-operating agreements. Many firms expand outside the EU and Europe to penetrate the 
relatively unexploited emerging countries. As these structural changes in the manufacturing 
industry proceed, the dairy firms face continuously new challenges.  
 
The European grocery retail chains are internationalising and consolidating. From 1991 to 
1994 about 90 percent of growth in the top ten retailers took place within country boarders. In 
the following four years almost 50 percent of the growth stemmed from European cross-
boarder expansion (Gurdjian et al. 2000). Compared to most other European countries, the 
Swedish retail structure is very concentrated as the top three chains control more than 80 
percent of the market. This concentration process has implications for the power balance 
between dairy firms and the even stronger retail chains (Hultén & Nyberg 2000). As retailers 
are Arla Foods’ biggest customers the structural changes in this sector must be considered. 
 
The changing behaviour of consumers has big impact on dairies. Consumers in different EU 
countries get more similar buying and consumption patterns, which has implications for the 
dairy firms in their decisions as to product portfolios. The constant flow of information and 
commercials from media and Internet etc. create similar behaviour and demands. At the same 
time people tend to individualize their behaviour as an expression of different life styles. 
Consumers are becoming more aware of the environmental problems caused by different 
industries, the relevance of health and weight watching, which raises pressure on food 
producers. This generates opportunities in growing markets for food service, organic food, 
healthier food and functional food. The market for food products with added value is growing. 
 
All these changes pose challenges to the food producers. They have to be flexible and act fast 
to defend their market positions. More important is, though, that they continuously have to 
consider their structural arrangements. For example, core competencies within a firm seldom 
are sufficient – so, it is necessary to build alliances with other firms. Further, strategic 
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alliances can be used to create synergies and eliminate weaknesses, as well as to reach the size 
of operations necessary to gain competitiveness. 
 
 
1.2 Problem 
 
Arla Foods has the objective of achieving an average growth in turnover of 10% per year over 
a five-year period. This expansion should be attained through a combination of organic 
growth and growth through mergers and acquisitions in selected foreign markets (Arla Foods’ 
annual report 2001/02). Considering the structural changes of the grocery retail chains and the 
dairy manufacturing sectors, as well as the changes in agricultural policy and consumer 
demand, this objective must be considered very ambitious. By all probability, alliance-
building activities must be the most essential element in Arla Foods’ expansion strategy.  
 
Depending on the financial structure and the market positions of a firm, different types of 
strategic alliances are more or less appropriate. Important to consider is also the co-operative 
business form of the firm – alliance strategies are quite dissimilar in co-operatives and IOFs 
(Investor Owned Firms) as the two business forms deviate in many crucial respects. They 
have different types of ownership, different capital formation possibilities, different raw 
produce bases, different decision-making procedures, etc.  
 
Hence, the problem addressed in this study is how European dairy processing firms can use 
strategic alliances in a way to strengthen their competitive positions on different markets. The 
focus is placed on Arla Foods, i.e., Arla Foods itself as well as its main competitors, both 
other farmer co-operatives and IOFs.  
 
 
1.3 Problem analysis and aim  
 
A strategic alliance exists when two or more firms co-operate under specific forms to achieve 
certain benefits. Firms can be expected to co-operate when the benefits of co-operation 
exceed those of working alone. Two important factors characterizing alliances are the degree 
of organizational integration and capital integration. The six categories of alliances – 
acquisitions, mergers, equity share holdings, joint ventures, licensing agreements and general 
or unspecified agreements – can be explained mainly through differences in these two factors. 
Apart from this the categories diverge in many other respects. This is explained in chapter 4. 
 
Most firms operating in market economies are IOFs (Investor-Owned Firms), organized in 
legal forms such as joint-stock companies, partnerships and proprietary firms. The purpose of 
an investor owned firm is to give investors return on capital invested. French Danone, 
Bongrain and Lactalis, Italian Parmalat and German Müller are examples of IOFs in the 
European dairy industry. Co-operatives are owned by a group of individuals or firms, who 
practice trade with the co-operative. Arla Foods is a cooperative society, whose members are 
milk suppliers, which makes this a vertical integrated organization with a common 
management. Other dairy co-operatives in Europe are Dutch Friesland Coberco, Campina, 
French Sodial and German Nordmilch. Co-operatives and IOFs compete on the same markets 
but with dissimilarities in prerequisites. This subject is more explicitly treated in chapter 4.  
 
Strategic alliances can be horizontal, vertical or a combination of these two. Horizontal 
alliances are alliances between dairy firms, while vertical alliances concerns firms in 
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different stages of the value chain. This investigation includes all types of alliances. Likewise, 
the study concerns both national alliances and international, cross-border alliances.  
 
The purpose of this study is to assess possible choices of alliance formation in the European 
dairy industry with special reference to Arla Foods and a few of its main competitors. This 
includes both the identification of various alliance types and the evaluation of each of these, 
whereby the assessment is made according to criteria of dairy processor competitiveness, 
expressed in terms of expansion opportunities. 
 
To examine how alliance activities can strengthen competitive positions, the characteristics of 
the alliance types are identified and connected to the characteristics of co-operative firms. 
With reference to this a comparison between a few European dairy firms regarding strategic 
alliance activities is provided, elucidating the benefits and drawbacks of a co-operative 
against an IOF. To utilize strategic alliances in an optimal way both external and internal 
factors are of importance, and these factors are taken into consideration in the study.  
 
Several theories are applicable to this subject but the findings in this study are analyzed 
according to the resource-based theory (RB theory). This theory sees the firm as a bundle of 
resources possessed, and it treats how these can be used to create added value in combination 
with various other resources. Hence, the resource-based theory seems to be promising as a 
tool for analysing strategic alliances. Alliance formations are a way whereby the participating 
partners hope to gain market strength by combining each partner’s specific set of resources.  
 
 
1.4 Structure  and approach 
 
The number of strategic alliances, not only in the dairy industry but also in food industries at 
large, seems to be increasing. For example, the volume of corporate takeovers among 
European retail chains more than quadrupled between 1994 and 1998. This development is a 
consequence of changes in the market environment of the allying partners. Hence, a 
description of contemporary structural developments in the dairy sector is provided in 
Chapter 2. The various sectors of the dairy processors’ business environment comprise a wide 
range – consumers, retail trade, etc. Together, these changes indicate further consolidation in 
the foreseeable future. One scenario is the evolution of a European giants league ; another one 
is that countervailing forces will give space for dairy processors with regional strongholds.  
 
Chapter 3 presents some of the largest dairy processing firms in Europe and their strategies. 
Given the aim of the study, Arla Foods is of course chosen as one of firms to be presented. 
Due to limited resources for the study, only few other firms are selected, and these should be 
some of the main competitors of Arla. Another criterion is that these other firms should be 
different from each other in terms of  strategy and markets. As the preceding section states 
that resource-based theory is a suitable tool for theoretical analyses of strategic alliances, the 
firms under study should above all be divergent when it comes to resource bases. This means 
that they should have different organizational structures. Departing from these criteria the 
choice of competitors falls on the Dutch dairy cooperative Friesland Coberco (with business 
operations conducted in a subsidiary that is jointly owned with investors), the Dutch 
cooperative Campina (which has suppliers with heavy individual investments in the 
cooperative firm), and Danone, which is a multinational, investor-owned conglomerate based 
in France. Chapter 3 provides a descriptive image of each of these firms’ market positions, 
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products, and of course strategic alliances, thereby laying the ground for the theoretical 
discussions in the subsequent chapter.  
 
In Chapter 4 the theoretical framework is accounted for. The concept of resources follow the 
chapter as strategic alliances can be regarded as the participating partners’ way of rearranging 
their resource bases so as to gain strength and competitiveness on the markets. The point of 
departure is the concept of strategic alliances (Section 4.1), followed by a classification of 
alliances that can be used in the following analyses (Section 4.2). The six most commonly 
adopted alliance types are explained and compared, thus arriving at specifications of the 
conditions when each of them is most appropriate. What are the pros and cons of the different 
categories; what makes them possible and what makes them successful? Further, which are 
the motives behind the formation of strategic alliances, as reported by previous studies? The 
resource-based theory is then scrutinized. The aim is to identify a number of theoretical 
constructs that can serve as criteria when assessing the various strategic alliances in the four 
firms under study. As these firms are structured according to quite different organisational 
models and hence, can be expected to have very varying resource bases, it is relevant to 
investigate these possible differences. The characteristics of the three co-operative business 
forms and the IOF business form are scrutinized from a resource base theoretical perspective, 
to identify which alliance type that matches the prerequisites of the different enterprise 
structures. Hence, the chapter concludes with a number of hypotheses concerning the strategic 
alliances of Arla Foods and three of its main competitors, and discussions about motives for 
forming alliances according to what earlier researchers report 
 
The empirical material is presented in Chapter 5. It consists of a description of some strategic 
alliances that the four firms under study have conducted during the last few years, at least 
some alliances that are accessible through mass media. The information sources are Internet, 
journals and books and to some extent, personal communication. The data collected is 
classified according to the categorization, identified in Section 4. 2.  
 
In Chapter 6 the results are presented and discussed, derived from findings in Chapters 2 till 
5. There are findings within two categories. One concerns explanations to the choice of 
different strategic alliance forms whereby the resource bases of the alliance partners turns out 
to be decisive, including how these resources match each other as well as the market 
requirements (Section 6.1). The other type of finding is related to the resource bases of dairy 
processors with different organisational structure, i.e., cooperatives with different 
organisational models and the investor-owned business model (Section 6.2). Depending on 
the organisational model, the firms differ in terms of resources and so their choice of strategic 
alliance type is due to differ.  
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2. The dairy business environment 
 
2.1 Elements of the dairy business environment 
 
A firm’s strategy can be better understood by examining its business environment. All market 
participants, like suppliers, customers, consumers, the political government and competitors, 
affect a firm’s actions. Some important market players that affect dairies are the retail 
industry, food service, and food manufacturers both in the dairy industry and in other sectors, 
consumers, competitors and agricultural policies. All these are undergoing structural changes 
that have an impact on future strategies of European dairy firms.  
 
This chapter aims at exploring how the dairy cooperatives are affected by various changes in 
their business environment. Specifically, the chapter is focused towards factors that influence 
the dairy firms’ propensity to form strategic alliances and undertake other major structural 
changes. The presentation of the dairy processing firms is found in Chapter 3 while all other 
factors are discussed below.  
 
 
2.2 Retailing 
 
Structural changes 
 
The internal market of the EU creates possibilities for retailers to operate on a larger scale, 
expanding over country borders. Within the union it is possible to sell and buy food and other 
goods with little hindrance from tariffs and other barriers. With the Euro, cross-border 
shopping will probably increase and the products sold will be more similar than today. 
Previous decades of structural changes in the retail sector are not solely an outcome facilitated 
by the EU. Internationalisation and consolidation actions in this field would have been 
motivated and executed anyway.  
 
A few domestic retailers dominate many European countries, but patterns vary. In western 
Europe supermarkets and hypermarkets account for 96% of packaged food sales, 53% of fresh 
fruit and vegetables, 82% of soft drinks, 78% of cheese, 42% of fresh meat, 34% of fresh fish 
and sea food and 30% of fresh bread. Northern Europe has more super and hypermarkets per 
head than the southern parts, but the south is going toward a structure similar to the north. 
Internationalisation and consolidation activities in this sector are escalating all over Europe. 
From 1994 to 1998 the frequency of corporate takeovers in this sector more than quadrupled. 
From 1991 to 1994 about 90% of the European retail growth took place within country 
borders, while the fo llowing four years was dominated by cross-country growth. Significant 
consolidation within the western countries of Europe is increasing each country’s top three’s 
market shares as followed by Figure 2-1 (Gurdjian et al. 2000). 
 
Grocery retailers follow three main growth strategies. Firstly they transform into new and 
bigger store formats increasing their shares of their home markets. Secondly, using superior 
competencies in different fields retailers can enter new markets and get competitive 
advantages over retailers lagging behind in the structural transformation. Thirdly, retailers 
expand through acquisitions of national competitors or foreign firms (Hultén & Nyberg 
2000).  
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Figure 2-1: Concentration in the food retail industry (M+M Eurodata 2002) 
 
American and European firms dominate in these activities, and so far European firms 
dominate the European markets. American Wal Mart is the biggest retailer in the world with 
annual sales of 191 billion US$ by the year of 2000, (compared to the second largest, French 
Carrefour, with annual sales of 60 billion US$) (Ghauri et al. 2003), and dominates the US 
market. Wal Marts expansion into Europe through takeovers in the UK, acquired ASDA in 
1999, and in Germany, acquired Wertkauf in 1997 and Interspar in 1998, signals that it sees 
Europe as more than a test market. This strategy puts pressure on big European retail firms to 
secure their positions on different markets. As a response to Wal Mart’s takeovers, French 
Carrefour and Promodès merged, to secure their positions toward competitors in the Belgian, 
French, Portuguese, Spanish and South American markets (Gurdjian et al. 2000). 
 
On the Swedish market, where the market situation at the present is quite extreme, the top 
three retailers control more than 80% of the market. So far Swedish retailers have been 
successful in locking out competitors, and big European retail firms have preferred 
investments in other countries where cultural differences are smaller compared with their 
home markets, and where the markets are more open. This might change in the near future as 
foreign retail firms are starting to establish themselves in Sweden. In year 2000 Ahold 
acquired 50% of Swedish ICA, now controlling the company from Ahold's head office in the 
Netherlands. ICA Ahold owns stores in six countries: Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. Coop Norden, owned by the unions of Swedish, Norwegian and Danish 
consumer cooperatives, operates stores in these three countries. Swedish Axfood, acquirer of 
Finish Spar, operates franchised shops in Finland and Sweden (Hultén & Nyberg 2000). By 
the year of 2003 a new player entered the Swedish retail market. Lidl, a German firm, intends 
to enter by making greenfield investments and operate supermarkets and hypermarkets with 
superior technology. 
 
What factors determine the choice of new markets or countries to enter? A market can be 
more or less attractive to penetrate depending on entry barriers and the match between firm 
and market. Competitive strengths like technology, management and financial strengths of 
established firms relative to new entrants have impact on success or failure by the entrant. 
Market entering barriers can be a tactical barrier; established firms can deter entrants by limit 
pricing or predatory pricing. Alternatively, firms trying to keep out competitors can open new 
stores in a faster pace than otherwise motivated, to position themselves at attractive locations. 
Established firms have built up long-term relations with suppliers and loyalty among 
consumers, which can make it hard for entrants to take market shares. Structural barriers to 
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entry can be legal regulations and an underdeveloped system for FDI, (Foreign Direct 
Investments) (Hultén & Nyberg 2000). 
 
Some of the drivers behind the consolidation wave are the capital market, competitive 
pressure and economies of scale and scope.  
 
· Expectations from the capital market make growth necessary. Investors require return on 
capital and the situation of saturated home markets drive companies with growth 
objectives to expand through international expansion or acquisitions. The composition of 
market value of German METRO and French Casino shows that current cash flows 
account for only one-third of their capitalization and investors´ expectations for the rest. 
Companies with a low market-to-book value may signal lack of credibility needed for 
future growth, which makes them potential targets for takeovers (Gurdjian et al. 2000). 
· Competition among retailers intensifies as big actors expand over country borders. In a 
dynamic time of cross boarder expansion retailers need to act fast to get leadership 
positions on their target markets (Gurdjian et al. 2000). 
· Economic rationales by scale and scope are more difficult to achieve in international 
expansions. The still fragmented retail sector in Europe with differences in management 
styles, legal regulations, consumer tastes, local market conditions, competitive 
environments, and incompatible IT and logistic systems, make international growth more 
complex. There is a trend toward converging tastes and lifestyles among Europeans, but 
compared to America dissimilarities are quite big. Economies of scale and scope by 
operating across borders are to some extent depending on large markets for identical 
products, currency and ability to synchronise logistics and administration, which is easier 
in domestic expansion. Only one third of the international takeovers between 1994 and 
1998 won approval from the capital markets while the approval for national takeovers was 
two thirds. But despite the obstacles on the European market, retailers must act now. 
There is a trend toward converging tastes among Europeans, the introduction of the Euro 
has begun in several EU-countries and new technology for transporting information and 
products more effectively is constantly innovated (Gurdjian et al. 2000). 
 
Another positive outcome of consolidation across boarders can be joint purchasing. To realize 
savings from international purchasing, retailers try to improve competencies in three main 
areas: getting better deals from manufacturers, influence suppliers and harmonize 
assortments. 
 
· The great variety in European rebate systems makes it hard to compare and find the 
lowest prises for food and other goods. Manufacturers earn a lot of money on price 
differences between countries and it will be hard to make them give up these gains 
(Gurdjian et al, 2000). Comparable and similar goods are sold at different prices on the 
European market, making it possible for market leaders with strong positions to charge 
higher prices than a newly established firm. By comparing the international price list a 
retailer can choose to purchase each product in the market where it is most favourably 
priced (Hultén & Nyberg 2000).  
· When it comes to influencing suppliers the power balance between the players is a matter 
of importance. Prices are to some extent determined by the relative size of the parties, 
raising incentives for both sides to maintain a balance in size (Hultén & Nyberg 2000). 
When retailers are consolidating, manufacturers may not be able to resist demands from 
this sector in the future. In 1997, the top ten retailers accounted for about 34 percent of 
total sales of consumer goods in Europe while the top ten consumer goods manufacturers 
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accounted for only 14 percent. Manufacturers have so far avoided preferred- or integrated-
supplier relationships with global retailers because it would damage their independence 
(Gurdjian et al. 2000).  
· Research shows that the greater the overlap in assortment, in different markets, the greater 
purchasing conditions can be achieved. Streamlining the supplier base and product variety 
can make a firm more profitable. Private labelling generates advantages here because the 
products come from the same suppliers and therefore they are identical. Differences in 
consumer patterns set the limits (Gurdjian et al. 2000). 
 
Private labelling 
 
Retailers with a high percentage of private labels can benefit from the identical products made 
by the same supplier when it comes to harmonizing. Through branding retailers can develop 
special images for quality and variety, using their superior consumer contacts. When selling 
private label products retailers can use their direct contact with the consumers to map their 
behaviour more exact than food manufacturers. According to Wickberg (2002), consumers 
demanding low price alternatives created markets for private labels and retailers could 
increase profitability through improved margins and increased business volumes by 
undercutting the traditional manufacturers’ product prices. 
  
Wickberg (2002) states that private label concepts are more developed in the northern parts of 
Europe. In the EU the UK has the largest share of private labels, where they stood for about 
54% of total sales in supermarkets and hypermarkets by the year of 1998. In Sweden the 
corresponding figure was about 8%. 
  
Private labels also affect the relationships between retailers and manufacturers. Relations 
depend on the market situation for private labels in different countries. Looking at dairy 
products, large Swedish dairies have been reluctant to manufacture private label products to 
retailers, exceptions made when they have had spare capacity to fill. Otherwise their margins 
on supplying private labels are lower than margins on their own brands. Swedish retailers 
seek cooperation with smaller manufacturers where the main attention can be dedicated to 
private labels and competences can be traded in long-term relationships. As long as private 
labels do not take larger shares of total sales than they do today, larger manufacturers, like 
Arla Foods, do not feel forced to cooperate through supplying private labels to retailers.  
 
In the UK the situation is different since private labels stand for more than half of total sales. 
Dairies stand in line to sign private label contracts with retailers, and in some cases dairies 
rather use capacity to manufacture private labels. UK manufacturers can benefit from long-
term relationships with retailers, since their own brands are promoted in the stores as well. 
Being a dedicated private label producer helps when introducing manufacturer brands in niche 
categories. High volumes of supplied private labels create security in revenues (Wickberg 
2002). 
  
Disadvantages of these relationships are that manufacturers are dependent on the contracts to 
fill capacity, and agreements are ”loose”, so a nullified contract can strike producers suddenly 
and with no warning. In case of lower-margin private labels, they also decrease shelf space in 
stores for national brands (Wickberg 2002). 
  
When manufacturing private labels, traditional co-operatives have several advantages. Some 
of the conditions that favour co-operatives in these activities are (Nilsson & Björklund 2003): 
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· Competitive advantage through better prerequisites for producing at lower cost per unit 
produced. 
· At times of intensified competition members are not willing to invest capital, and 
subcontract work does not require much capital. 
· Co-operatives under obligation to buy any quantities produced by members may have 
difficulties with disposal of large volumes. Subcontract work for retailers can in a 
competitive environment be a good alternative. 
· Traditional co-operatives in competitive environments are big, since the smaller ones 
cannot survive in open markets. A big firm can dedicate a smaller part of capacity for 
subcontract work without giving up its independency, and without risk of bankruptcy in 
case of a nullified contract. 
· Members of traditional co-operatives tend to be quite conservative and cautious, which 
could advocate relatively simple activities like subcontract work in a competitive 
environment.  
 
Wholesale 
 
The retail sector is affected by European consumer behaviour. Younger people’s lifestyles are 
shifting and more meals are consumed outside the home. In 1995 about 32% of total food 
consumption was spent on meals outside the home, rose to 35% by the year of 2000 and is 
expected to approach 38% by 2005. This will generate an increase in wholesale demand with 
4 to 5% a year, compared to the increase in retail demand of 1 to 2% (Castrillo et al. 2003). 
  
Purchase patterns also shift toward fewer shopping occasions in bigger store formats. So, one 
big customer for retailers to target is food service. Large-scale operators in the food service 
sector are presently standing for 30% of food service sales and are expected to rise to 40% by 
the year of 2010. These big players prefer suppliers that can offer national coverage and 
competitive prices on their regular, homogeneous orders. Average overall margins are higher 
in wholesale than in retail. Changes in the competitive environment and today’s fragmented 
market situation make it feasible for retailers to go into wholesaling and consolidate. 
Demands mainly come from smaller grocery stores too small to buy directly from producers, 
and food service operators. Retailers going into whole selling could make them even more 
powerful against food producers competing in orders from food service. One example of a 
European company that has succeeded with this format on a global scale is the German 
Metro-chain. Dutch Ahold’s wholesale Deli XL is operating in the Netherlands and has plans 
of expanding into other European countries (Castrillo et al. 2003).  
 
Future scenarios 
 
According to Gurdjian et al. (2000), there are two scenarios. The first is a Europe where a 
handful of giant companies merge and the top tens will control 60% of the market. The 
situation of today is far from this scenario, but some players tend to strive in this direction. 
European takeovers by Wal-Mart, Carrefour-Promodès and METRO reveal strategies 
suggesting that this is a possible outcome. The second is a regional-stronghold scenario, 
where the regional consolidation will continue and the big companies will strengthen their 
positions but stick to their home markets. In this scenario the top tens hold 50% of the market.  
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2.3 Food service 
 
The facts about the food service sector is taken from Promar International (not dated). The 
European food service sector is growing, on average, at a rate of 2.75% per year, which is 
about five times as fast as the retail sector. Food service is available in a wide range of 
formats and under the right circumstances it will create a great potential of profitability for 
manufacturers. Food service supply chains are more complex and longer than in retail, 
making it a challenge to manufacturers and strong, interactive relationships and partnerships 
throughout the supply chain will be crucial to success. Considerable consolidations and a 
better-organized supply chain are about to open valuable opportunities for manufacturers 
making it easier to control the flow of products to a less fragmented customer base. 
 
Consolidation and organization of the food service sector have implications on sales and 
purchasing procedures, negotiations and the distribution of power between suppliers and 
customers. For manufacturers to successfully exploit the opportunities of supplying the food 
service sector they must consider some critical issues: 
 
· What relationships exist within the supply chain? 
· Who takes control (or has the power) over product selection and price? 
· If and how is power being redistributed? 
· How can these relationships be designed to operate effectively in the European food 
service sector? 
 
In more developed markets manufacturers are starting to pay more attention to the food 
service sector and becoming more responsive to food service customer requirements. Many 
customers purchase their products from the cash and carry sector while larger food service 
chains are more likely to contract with suppliers. One general trend in Europe is the 
rationalisation and streamlining of supplier bases. Instead of having a facetted base of 
suppliers caterers seem to prefer fewer suppliers, which will enable them to deal with larger 
volumes. 
 
The key requirements and points of value in food service can be stated as follows:  
 
· Product: The product criteria are most important and include product quality, consistency 
and a lower level of preparation time. A high level of customisation and adaptation (added 
value) to the caterer industry are preferred. A good way of achieving the optimal fit 
between product and customer is to work together to create the right product formula. 
· Packaging: Most customers do not view this criterion as very important as long as 
products are well protected and easy to store. Own label products face different 
requirements. Customers demand functional pack sizes and minimized wastage. 
· Price: Price is ranked highly among customers, and highest among publicly owned firms. 
Price is compared with the ability to add value. Ingredients tend to be selected by qualities 
rather than price while products with which the operator has less involvement (ready 
prepared foods and ready-to-consume products) seem to be selected by price. 
· Service: This criterion relates to reliability and support from suppliers and is an important 
customer requirement. In the long run it will probably gain further emphasis when 
partnerships between suppliers and customers become more frequent. Customers wait for 
manufacturers to understand food service better so business can be better for both parts. 
There is also a need for expansion and development of manufacturers’ product portfolios 
for food service concepts. 
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2.4 Consumer demand 
 
The constant flow of information and commercials from media and Internet etc. affects people 
and create similar behaviours and demands. A counter tendency is that people tend to 
individualize in consumer behaviour due to life style, personality, preferences etc. Consumers 
are also becoming more aware of environmental problems caused by different industries, the 
relevance of health and weight watching, which raises pressure on food producers. More 
meals are eaten outside homes and the food service sector is growing. These factors generate 
opportunities in growing markets for food service, ecological food, healthier food and 
functional food. The market for products with added value is growing. When expanding 
product portfolios firms have to consider their customers’ needs. Differentiation is costly, and 
often requires big investments and marketing expenditures. 
 
 
2.5 Competition  
 
Milk production and milk consumption in the world are increasing with 1-2% per year, and all 
big dairy firms want part of this to increase market shares. Countries within the EU stand for 
about 25% of total milk production and in the last ten year period countries like Australia and 
New Zeeland have radically increased their production of milk and thereby their influence in 
global trade with dairy products (www.svenskmjolk.se/branschfakta.asp 2003-09-04). Only 
20 dairy firms have a turnover larger than 1 billion Euros up to 6 billion Euros but several 
smaller firms are also to be considered competitors. Among competitors there are 
manufacturers in other product categories, like soft-drink producers, non-dairy sandwich 
spread manufacturers and producers of other snacks. All these firms have different capacities, 
i.e. production, marketing, financial, human and logistical resources (van der Krogt 2003) 
  
Markets and competition are dissimilar for different dairy products. Competition on cheese 
markets is intense and has led to price pressure and consolidation among producers. Fresh 
product distribution depends on geography and logistics and competition on these markets is 
relatively weak. Retailers and purchasers in food service have not many options but to buy 
from local suppliers, but just knowing that customers can turn to competitors affects dairies’ 
marketing. A trend toward increasing imports can be identified and competition has 
intensified the last few years and will continue to grow stronger in the near future. Retailers 
will start to look for partners to develop private labels and if one dairy firm contracts with a 
retailer on a specific market the others will follow (Nilsson & Björklund, 2003). 
 
 
2.6 The political scene  
 
The upcoming reform of the EU agricultural policy points toward a decline in profits for 
Swedish dairies. Calculations indicate a possible decrease in the raw milk price with 0,80 
SEK from today’s almost 3 SEK in the next five years 
(www.svenskmjolk.se/press/IE/Pressmeddelande.asp 2003-03-11). 
 
Direct reimbursements will cover about half of the decline of the milk price but supports will 
be based on farms instead of production, which will lead to misdirected supports according to 
Svensk Mjölk, (Swedish Dairy Association). With no requirements on continued production a 
milk producing farmer in business 2004 can quit producing the next year and still get support 
while a farmer who starts milk production after 2004 will have to manage without subsidies. 
 12 
An untenable situation where no one will have enough incentives to invest in a capital and 
labour intensive business in which profits decline and supports do not stand in proportion to 
performance (www.svenskmjolk.se/press/IE/Pressmeddelande.asp 2003-01-23). 
 
Swedish dairies have been strongly protected by agricultural policies both before the entry 
into the EU in 1995 and after through CAP. CAP is especially constructive for traditional 
cooperatives. When dairies do not succeed to sell their milk on the open markets, they can sell 
it to the EU at a guaranteed price. This weakens competition because smaller volumes reach 
the market. Thanks to these policies firms can set a raw milk price that makes it possible for 
the members to manage economically and put aside some for collective funds. This way 
money is available for subsidies between member categories (Nilsson & Björklund 2003) 
 
 
2.7 Development of alliances 
 
Observing the ongoing changes in the immediate surroundings of dairies one can understand 
the need for new strategies. To be able to meet the challenges arising from several 
environmental sources simultaneously firms need a strong resource base, and few firms are 
experts in all necessary domains to beat competition on their own.  
 
In the last four years more than 200 alliances have been initiated between European dairy 
firms. In a strategic alliance only some of the participants’ business activities are involved and 
except for these activities partners remain autonomous and often competitors (apart from the 
cases of mergers and acquisitions). By combining firms’ resources possibilities are created to 
promote international expansion, to further penetrate home markets, to strengthen product 
portfolios etc.  
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3. Major European dairy firms 
 
3.1 Arla Foods  
 
In 2000 Swedish Arla and Danish MD Foods initiated a cross border merger. The new firm 
was named Arla Foods amba. To exploit the synergies of the merger a structure plan was 
drawn up. In 2003 about two thirds of the projects have been carried out and the plan is 
supposed to be completely fulfilled by the year of 2005. Arla Foods is a cooperative owned 
by 6539 Swedish and 7103 Danish members. Since Arla Foods bought 50% of the shares in 
English Express Dairies, one of UK’s biggest dairies, it will have three domestic markets. In 
2002 the number of employees was 17 866 (Nilsson & Björklund 2003).  
 
About 7000 million tons of milk is processed every year. The total turnover by the year of 
2002 was 39 441 MDKK. Arla Foods is the largest transnational cooperatives in the world 
(Nilsson & Björklund 2003) 
 
The market situation is moving toward a more unified Nordic as well as European market 
where competition intensifies. For Arla Foods to retain its competitiveness it must incorporate 
these facts into its strategy. The introductions of a common Arla brand, as well as the 
streamlining of operations and reallocation of resources, are steps in this direction. Arla’s 
master brand, a red mark with white text, is the new trademark under which all the other 
trademarks will be gathered. The purpose of this trademark is to increase consciousness about 
products and values of the firm, and make it a leading brand for European dairy products 
(Arla Foods’ Annual Report 2001/02). With few exceptions Arla Foods is at present reluctant 
towards retail private brands. 
(www.arlafoods.se/press/artikel.asp?more=757&firstYear=1997&firstMonth=9&y1=2002&m
1=alla&fras= 2003-09-26). 
  
The Swedish and Danish markets 
 
Arla Foods has a strong market position in Sweden and Denmark. To gain even larger market 
shares on these markets, the firm has to grow through new products developed for new 
consumer groups, and products that can be consumed at new occasions. Efforts are made to 
accomplish growth through opportunities created by the expanding food service sector. 
Competition is intensified in Denmark as retailers strive to increase sales of private brands. 
Arla Foods will cooperate with the retail chains to the extent that independence will not be 
threatened, and a good balance between private brands and Arla Foods’ own brands must be 
obtained (Arla Foods’ Annual Report 2001/02).  
 
The UK market 
 
In the UK, Arla Foods’ third domestic market, the firm works to strengthen its market 
position, especially in the categories of butter and fresh milk. Arla Foods has announced a 
merger with the UK’s second largest dairy firm Express Dairies. Express is the biggest 
supplier of fresh milk and cream, which is its main business, to retailers in the UK. It is also 
the biggest doorstep deliverer of milk. Express and Arla Foods will become a leading dairy 
supplier to supermarkets with strong brands. This strategic step will strengthen Arla Foods’ 
position on this market. 
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By combining the two firms’ businesses, production sites and distribution channels can be 
utilized more effectively. The two firms will have access to each other’s R&D and technical 
facilities and create greater financial strength. Together they can cope with growing demands 
from retailers and cover a larger geographical area 
(http://www.arlafoods.se/press/artikel.asp?more=891&firstYear=1997&firstMonth=9&y1=20
03&m1=9&fras=, 2004-01-07).  
 
Arla Foods and the New Zeeland dairy Fonterra created a JV owned by Arla Foods to 75%. 
The motives for this alliance were product development of butter, better utilization of the 
firm’s production capacity and creation of a company to handle decreasing demand. 
Distribution, marketing and sales of the strong brands Lurpak and Anchor on the UK market 
will be more efficient through the JV. Lurpak is the second biggest and Anchor third in sales 
volume in the butter category and market shares are still increasing (Arla Foods’ Annual 
Report 2001/02).  
 
Another strategic step made by Arla Foods to strengthen its position on the UK market was to 
acquire HT Webb. HT Webb imports and produces special cheese so now Arla Foods can 
offer local and foreign cheese products to retailers.  
 
Arla Foods UK has established a food service division to exploit the opportunities in this 
growing sector (Arla Foods annual report 2001/02). Another effort is to change people’s 
breakfast habits. In England only 10% of all yogurts sold are consumed in the morning 
compared to Sweden and Denmark where the corresponding figure is 70%. Arla Foods, 
together with the retail chain Tesco, has introduced three new yogurts as an alternative to the 
traditional English breakfast of eggs and bacon. Some other well-known Scandinavian yogurt 
products, adapted to English food habits, are produced in Denmark and sold under Tesco’s 
private brands 
(www.arlafoods.se/press/artikel.asp?more=758&firstYear=1997&firstMonth=9&y1=2002&m
1=alla&fras= 2003-09-26). 
 
Europe 
 
A general trend in Europe has been week economies and anxiety at the prospect of the future. 
Demodulation of agricultural policies, the enlargement of the EU and the introduction of the 
Euro in some countries are some factors that will redesign conditions for dairy firms. In spite 
of price pressure and tougher competition Arla Foods, in the year of 2002, managed to reach a 
good result. Division Europe works with focus on more value-added products instead of bulk 
products that are facing declining prices. To keep up the speed in introducing value-added 
products investments and marketing expenses for product development will increase. 
Resources will be assigned to strengthen sales to the food service sector, which advances and 
grows in most parts of Europe (Arla Foods annual report 2001/02). 
 
The Eastern European markets 
 
Arla Foods’ market position on the Eastern European markets is weak. As several of these 
nations enter the EU, it will be easier to operate on these markets. Selected markets and 
product categories will be prioritised (Arla Foods annual report 2001/02) and Arla Foods has 
declared that it wishes to gain a strong market position in Poland. The Polish economy 
becomes more similar to the German, which means increased import of for example cheeses 
such as dessert cheese and blue cheese. The Polish retail sector is still dominated by smaller 
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shops that stand for about 65% of total sales, but big international chains are gaining ground 
(www.arlafoods.se/press/artikel.asp?more=855&mer=start 2003-09-26) and control 23% of 
the market. With Poland as its base Arla Foods intends to tenfold sales in Eastern Europe in a 
five-year period. The most important category will be cheese. According to a study by 
German ZMP people in Eastern Europe will increase cheese consumption from 7.5 to 9 kilos 
per head in six years. Goals will be achieved by acquisitions of local dairies and through 
export of value-added products from Scandinavia 
(http://www.arlafoods.se/press/artikel.asp?more=785&firstYear=1997&firstMonth=9&y1=20
02&m1=11&fras= 2003-09-26).  
 
The North American, Middle East and Japanese markets 
 
Arla Foods has strong market positions on the North American, Middle East and Japanese 
markets. Value-added products have helped in times of general price pressure on these 
markets. The US dollar is an important currency for Arla Foods and fluctuating and weak 
exchange rates in 2002 affected results. This could partly be avoided if higher prices could be 
attained (Arla Foods’ annual report 2001/02). 
 
Some alliances formed by Arla Foods  
 
In 2001 Arla Foods formulated a strategy, which included strong growth through mergers and 
acquisitions. Since then, several projects have been implemented while others are still to be 
conducted. Some of these projects are being subject to analyses in Chapter 5. Projects include: 
 
· An Argentine whey factory has been built in cooperation with Argentine SanCor, with the 
purpose to strengthen Arla Foods’ leading position as global supplier of whey proteins to 
the food industry.  
· A joint venture company was initiated with German Nordzücker, to produce the sweetener 
Gaio tagatose.  
· In connection with the merger with Express Dairies, a new dairy is built in Leeds because 
the existing one in the middle of the city cannot increase its capacity. The new factory is a 
step toward further rationalizations.  
· Arla Foods’ joint venture agreement with New Zeeland Fonterra has also led to 
rationalizations. About 35 000 tons of butter and compound products are now produced at 
Arla Foods’ dairies in Varde and Götene instead of in England.  
· Arla Foods acquired English H.T. Webb, which imports cheese, in 2002 to widen the 
scope of the cheese assortment.  
· In 2002 Arla Foods merged with Danish Hellevad Omegns Andelsmejeri as a continuation 
of a close relationship.  
· In March 2002 Arla Foods bought 50% of the shares in Danish Cocio Chokolademælk 
A/S. 
· The effort to strengthen the market positions in Poland, acquiring Lindals, and other 
Eastern European markets was mentioned above.  
· Of course, also the merger between Arla and MD Foods is in itself a case to be analyzed.  
 
 
3.3 Friesland Coberco Dairy Foods Holding 
 
Friesland Coberco is a multinational Dutch co-operative. Zuivelcoöperatie De Zeven 
Provinciën U.A. holds Friesland Coberco’s shares. The firm is holding all shares of Friesland 
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Coberco Dairy Foods B.V. and Friesland International B.V. The former operates all Dutch 
activities and the latter operates all foreign activities. The work force consist of 16800 
employees of whom 11200 work outside the Netherlands. By the year of 2002 Friesland 
Coberco processed 5100 million kg of milk, bought from 11500 dairy farmers who are 
members of Zuivelcoöperatie De Zeven Provinciën U.A. The turnover in 2002 was 4723 
million Euros in Europe, West Africa and Southeast Asia, selling a wide range of dairy 
products and fruit-based drinks for the consumer market (FC’s annua l report 2002).  
 
Friesland Coberco has not made many acquisitions outside the Netherlands. Its strategy is to 
improve the quality of turnover and the profitability of operations. This is done through 
focusing on the markets where a strong position for branded products can be established. This 
firm is not prior looking for new markets but to further expand the market shares on already 
penetrated markets. Tight control of costs and a reduction of dependence on standard dairy 
products by generating a greater share of the turnover through branded products, are ways that 
Friesland Coberco will follow to keep competitive (FC’s annual report 2002). 
 
Friesland Coberco, like Arla Foods, pursues a multinational approach. Major cooperatives 
following this strategy extend their business over the five continents where they control 
industrial and commercial subsidiaries. In these respects there is no longer any difference 
compared to non-cooperative dairy multinational firms. Friesland Coberco and Arla Foods 
produce a wide range of sophisticated added-value products and develop mainly through 
intangible assets, like brand names and innovation potentials. These firms’ exploitation of 
market-power and abilities to innovate in research and development enable them to take 
positions on the world markets through price competitiveness. To succeed with this strategy a 
firm must be able to raise the necessary financial means (Guillouzo & Ruffio 2003).  
 
 
3.2 Campina 
 
Campina is a Dutch firm, which operates internationally. It is a dairy co-operative owned by 
9200 members (Campina’s Annual report 2002). The number of employees is about 6 900 of 
whom 50% is situated outside the Netherlands. This firm processed 5140 million kg of milk 
in year 2002, approximately half supplied by members. Net turnover in 2002 was 3707 
million Euros (Campina’s annual report 2002). 
 
Campina’s main focus is on the European market, for consumer products under the brands 
Campina, Landliebe in Germany and Mona in the Netherlands (Campina’s Annual report 
2002). Innovation, branding, efficiency and total chain control are key words in the Campina 
strategy (mail webmaster@campina.com). The firm is a major supplier of dairy products in 
the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, and it is investing to grow in Poland, Spain, Russia 
and the UK. Consumer products are also marketed in Africa and in the Middle and Far East. 
Development and production of ingredients for food and pharmaceutical industry are other 
important activities performed in the Netherlands, Germany and the US, and these products 
are sold all over the world (årsredov). Campina has done some acquisitions in Europe the last 
three years, mainly in Germany and the UK. Campina has a strong financial position (mail 
webmaster@campina.com). 
 
Campina’s strategy is to pay an over average price for milk produced by its members, and to 
do this it needs to operate on a large scale. An adequate scale is maintained through 
internationalisation with focus on consumer dairy products in Europe and dairy ingredients 
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worldwide. More exactly it will try to pursue a geographical market leadership in dairy drinks 
in Western Europe, above average growth in desserts in Europe and a world leadership in 
specific dairy ingredients. It tries to achieve its goals through organic growth as well as 
acquisitions. In October 2002 Campina acquired Superlife in the UK, which is a leading 
flavoured milk brand. This strengthened Campina’s position in the UK. In Germany it has 
strengthened its market position for desserts by acquiring Molkerei H. Stothmann GmbH 
(Campina’s annual report 2002). 
 
Campina follows a “cooperative strategy to the European market” to extend the domestic 
market. Relying on its strong cooperative identity and organizational resources that allow 
plans of original strategy of gradual membership internationalisation, Campina’s strategy 
aims at creating a European cooperative with members with similar rights and obligations. 
This strategy means high level of business rationalization, especially in the industrial domain 
where plants no longer match the local market requirements. Qualities used in extensions are 
industrial efficiency, product portfolio, brand reputation and innovation potential. For twenty 
years Campina was committed to a very ambitious external growth strategy on Dutch territory 
and abroad, Belgian and German markets in particular (Guillouzo & Ruffio 2003). Campina 
has a larger share of international turnover than Arla Foods and Friesland Coberco. (Bekkum 
2001, p 114)  
 
 
3.4 Danone 
 
Danone is a French IOF with about 92.209 employees in more than 120 countries. Danone is 
the volume leader in the world food industry with a wide range of products. Group Danone is 
made up of numerous companies consolidated either through the purchase accounting method 
or the equity method (http://www.danonegroup.com/group/index_group.html 2003-09-18). 
 
Danone’s strategy builds on three product groups, namely fresh dairy products, beverages, 
and biscuits and cereal products. It focuses on these products on a limited number of 
countries, selected for their growth potential, where Danone has the size to achieve economies 
of scale. On these markets Danone aims for close ties to consumers and long-term 
relationships with major retailers. To capitalize on its worldwide presence and leading 
position in local markets, Group Danone has introduced international cross-border structures 
to promote promising products and concepts in new geographical areas to accelerate growth 
while keeping costs down (http://www.danonegroup.com/group/index_group.html 2003-09-
18).  
 
About 70% of Danone’s sales occur in Western Europe. Danone is the leading producer of 
fresh dairy products in the US and Canada and has a strong position on the bottled water 
market there. In Brazil and Argentina its market position is very strong concerning cereal 
biscuits and snacks food. Danone has gone through with acquisitions in Tunisia and Morocco 
and have managed to become the leader in fresh dairy products on these markets. Saudi 
Arabia, Algeria, Turkey and Israel are other countries where Danone’s market position is 
strong. In the 1990s Danone expanded in central and Eastern Europe and is now number one 
in fresh dairy products, biscuits and snacks foods. In 1980s the Group expanded in the region 
of Asia through a joint venture with a Japanese firm to make and market fresh dairy products. 
Today it is the leading producer of bottled water and biscuits in a limited number of countries 
with strong local brands (http://www.danonegroup.com/group/index_group.html 2003-09-18).  
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4. Theory 
 
4.1 The concept of strategic alliances 
 
There are different conceptions about what constitutes a strategic alliance. Some include 
mergers and acquisitions and even loose collaborative agreements between producers and 
suppliers. According to Murray and Mahon (1993) the partners in an alliance are free to exit 
the relationship, which would exclude mergers and acquisitions. Some minimum criteria 
should be met though: the existence of strategically significant goals, mutual (but not 
necessarily equally distributed) benefits and that the benefits achieved through an alliance 
should outweigh those derived from other actions (Murray & Mahon, 1993). The subject 
seems to be in its theoretical beginning with many researchers trying to find generalizations; 
so different characteristics are accounted for, not excluding any type of alliance.  
 
Murray and Mahon (1993 pp. 103) define strategic alliances as ”a coalition of two or more 
organizations to achieve strategically significant goals and objectives that are mutually 
beneficial. These goals and objectives can be pursued in either the economic or political 
arena, and can be flexible in time orientation. Mutually beneficial does not imply equality of 
benefits, but does mean that all parties to the alliance receive benefit from it in proportion to 
contributions made. Moreover, the stability of the alliance will be a direct consequence of 
these benefits outweighing those of alternate arrangements”. 
 
Firms must be able to keep up in the speed of technological innovations and be fast when they 
aim for new markets. One key to be victorious in these tasks is to create collaborative 
advantages through strategic alliances (SAs). SAs can be seen as an alternative to 
internalisation and market exchange. Standing before a decision a firm may choose to (1) 
produce on its own, (2) purchase from markets, or (3) perform in collaboration with another 
firm. If efficient market exchanges are possible it is likely that a firm will continue alone (Das 
& Teng 2000). 
 
To meet consumer needs companies need their own skills and sometimes others to make 
products good enough. One firm is hardly ever an expert in all essential domains so it would 
benefit from seeking complement. Firms cooperate when the benefits of the cooperation 
exceed those of operating alone. Alliances can occur in response to two underlying 
motivations: a defensive instinct to survive or an offensive desire to achieve competitive 
advantage (Murray & Mahon 1993).  
 
Strategic alliances are a function of both organizational objectives and the conditions found in 
the environment. Both external environmental and internal organizational factors can be 
critical and create needs that can be satisfied through alliance activities. Organizational 
objectives as rationales to form alliances are to obtain technological and/or manufacturing 
capabilities and to get access to specific markets. These rationales are offensive to their 
character and undertaken to improve the competitive position before rivals. Defensive 
organizational rationales are to reduce financial risk, to reduce political risks (for example 
when doing foreign direct investments) and to achieve or ensure competitive parity (pre-
emptive alliances to block another organization’s action or to assure parity with a stronger 
industrial rival) (Murray & Mahon 1993).  
 
Environmental conditions under which strategic alliances are appropriate are, according to 
Murray & Mahon (1993). 
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· turbulence or uncertainty, 
· discontinuous changes, 
· rapid technological change,  
· technological change from numerous sources, 
· significant financial risk, 
· markets undergoing rapid change, 
· shifting rules of the game making penetration more difficult, 
· increasing political complexity, 
· large and complex projects, 
· increased competitiveness, 
· government protection and assistance. 
 
 
4.2 Alliance types 
 
Mergers and acquisition (M&A) 
 
Mergers are when two (or more) companies unify into a single organization, while in 
acquisition one company fully takes over another. In both cases full integration occurs. One 
central issue in these cases is the degree of interdependence. The more interdependent the 
partners are the greater the need for boundary permeability. Otherwise the cooperation would 
be very difficult to manage. In acquisitions there are often a big firm purchasing a smaller 
one, which makes it important how to allocate control. One drawback of M&A is that all 
resources of the digested firm are obtained, even the ones with no value for the acquirer. The 
unwanted assets may be hard to separate from the rest, which will lead to surplus or costs for 
disposal of unneeded resources. The degree of specificity in these assets will set the price for 
disposal (Das & Teng 2000)  
 
Acquisitions require financial capital and that the acquirer is not to risk averse. M&As enable 
firms to obtain scale advantages utilize physical resource bases, share risks and costs and 
create bigger capital bases. Acquisitions are the most frequently applied alliance type among 
dairies with 43% the last four years. Probable reasons are international expansion, home 
market expansion and taking control over competitors. Mergers have been few but the ones 
initiated have been big and cooperatives are involved in most of them. (van der Krogt, pers. 
communication 2003) A merger is an enormous endeavour in integrating. Owners, 
management staff, employees and all others involved have to shift mentally and be a part of a 
new corporate culture.  
 
Joint ventures 
 
The partners in joint ventures are separate legal entities bounded by a contract. A joint venture 
has its own identity and institutions and the relationship is often an evolving collaboration, 
which grows stronger with time. JVs with competitor firms as parents are more likely to fail 
because of overlapping in products and geographical markets (Das & Teng 2000). Firms in 
the alliance own the joint venture with equal or different shares of equity. A problem with the 
contract is that it reflects the situation when it is signed. But the market is in fact changing 
and this may lead to disputes, which is not really regulated in the contract.  
 
One reason to go into this sort of collaboration is when a company wants to dispose some 
resources. It can be difficult to get a price that reflects the real value of the resource if the 
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degree of specificity is high (tacit skills). If the seller and the potential buyer start a joint 
venture the buying company has the time to learn and realize the true value, and it will be in 
the selling company’s interest to do this in a good way to get the most out of it when it is time 
to sell. Mutual benefits are vital to avoid opportunistic behaviour. Other reasons for JVs are 
scale effects, synergy effects, easier to give good service to large retailers and increased 
competitiveness. Research shows that JVs are more commonly adopted in mature industries 
where it is important to gain economies of scale and scope (Das & Teng 2000). The greater 
part of JVs among dairies is international and is equally adopted by IOFs and cooperatives 
(van der Krogt, pers. communication 2003).  
 
Shares 
 
Buying shares in other firms can be a step toward a complete acquisition. A shareholder can 
give a firm power to affect decisions taken by another firm, and thereby influence the 
situation on the market. Level of control depends on the size of the share. Owning more than 
50% gives control because it will give the deciding vote in strategic decisions. The level of 
integration is low when a firm buys shares in other firms (van der Krogt, pers. communication 
2003). 
 
Co-operative agreements 
 
In the category of unspecified co-operating, cooperatives are the ones primarily engaged. The 
real structure of alliances placed in this category is not revealed and perhaps hidden agendas 
are the reason for this. It could be the limited owner / share incentive hindering a firm to 
publicly reveal its purpose. Strengthening of home market positions, international expansion, 
sale and synergy effects are the main reasons here (van der Krogt, pers. communication 
2003). 
 
Licensing  
 
A license agreement is when a firm purchases the right to use an asset for a particular time. It 
can be a product, a technology, a patent or innovation or some other specific resource. This 
alliance has a more narrow purpose than for example a joint venture; the need for 
collaboration is usually not as big. The licensor gets a royalty and revenues for former 
expenditure that it had developing the resource, and the licensee may overcome weaknesses in 
its organization without having to develop this, already developed, resource. Licensing a 
technology widely can lead to standardization.  
 
To make R&D profitable the Finnish dairy firm Valio has licensed its bacterial cultures and 
lactose-free milk all over the world. In the USA and in Canada cheese producers make cheese 
for Arla Foods after Danish recipe. Sodiaal’s yogurt Yoplait is represented in almost 50 
countries, and thereby has the largest global coverage of all fresh dairy brands. A trend 
toward fewer but larger global brands can be distinguished so brand licensing will probably 
increase in the near future (van der Krogt, pers. communication 2003). 
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4.3 Motives for strategic alliances 
 
Facilitation of international expansion  
 
Strategic alliances can be seen as vehicles through which mid-sized firms can compete more 
effectively against large companies and gain entry to markets without investing capital. 
Entering a country where the political climate is unstable and uncertain, a native guide is 
needed for local knowledge and contacts. In general, as turbulence and uncertainty increase an 
alliance can reduce or at least spread the risk. Political, economic, social and bureaucratic 
rules are changing all over the world and all the time, thereby creating a dynamic climate for 
international firms to operate in (Murray & Mahon 1993). 
 
Entry strategies may be licensing or franchising, entering into a joint venture or setting up a 
wholly owned subsidiary. Which way to go are partly a question of control and the level of 
resource commitment. The level of control is assumed to be lowest in licensing, highest in 
case of wholly owned subsidiary and somewhere between in the case of JVs. Resource 
commitment is low in licensing, high with wholly owned subsidiary and falls between these 
extremes in JVs. Starting up alone in foreign markets is an expensive, difficult and time-
consuming business and strategic alliances can offer considerable time savings. Also, the 
speed of internationalisation is critical and an early entry can be of crucial importance if a 
firm is going to gain a significant market share (Glaister & Buckley 1996).  
 
Product rationalization and economies of scale  
 
Organic growth may be limited by low product demand and the cost of firm growth. In an 
alliance costs can be reduced by comparative advantages, moving production of components 
or whole products to the firm with the best prerequisites for that particular production. 
Horizontal alliances can also reduce costs of larger outputs (Glaister & Buckley 1996).  
 
When it comes to investments to improve already existing products or the development of 
new ones R&D costs are significant. Sharing these costs and simultaneously making use of 
synergies by complementary resources, strategic alliances can be a good deal. New advanced 
technology is introduced on the market in a speed that most firms find it hard to cope with. 
Technological changes come from numerous sources and it is important to select the ones that 
will yield long-term competitive advantage at minimal cost and risk (Murray & Mahon 1993). 
 
Transfer of complementary technology, and exchange of patents 
 
Technology differences and degree of innovations separate firms regarding strategy. Highly 
innovative firms require substantial resources that can be provided by an alliance partner. 
When developing pioneering technology it can be good to tie other firms and their resources 
to it to make it legitimate. Interfirm cooperation has many times led to a standardization of 
new technology. One example of this is when Betamax developed a video recording format 
superior to VHS, but could never gain praise for this since VHS, through non-technical 
reasons including interfirm co-operation, made its format the standard (Eisenhardt, Bird & 
Schoonhoven 1996) 
 
Transfer of technology within an alliance is not just movement of technicalities. It must 
involve a long-term relationship in which the partners work closely together and learn by each 
other. In alliances firms are enabled to bring together complementary skills and talents, which 
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cover different aspects of the know-how needed in high technology industries. Exchange of 
patents can open for fast entry into new markets. Smaller firms seldom have the 
manufacturing capabilities needed to exploit developed technology and they benefit from 
alliances with bigger firms that can commercialise the technology (Glaister & Buckley 1996). 
 
Building competitiveness 
 
Joining forces in an alliance may enable firms to resist strong forces of competition, which 
could be hard for a single firm to withstand. In times of intense competition a joint venture 
with combined internal resources may have the opportunity to compete more effectively 
(Glaister & Buckley 1996). 
 
Conformity to host government policy 
 
Government policies affect firms and alliances can be formed to strengthen firms’ ability to 
affect policies. A firm that wants to enter a foreign market may be hindered by host 
government policies and some countries even insist that there is collaboration with local firms 
to get access to the market. Protectionist policies are not the only reason why firms choose to 
ally with local firms. Strategic alliances can be a convenient way of selling products in 
foreign markets (Glaister & Buckley 1996). 
 
Risk sharing  
 
Risk is often a critical aspect when it comes to investments, and strategic decisions are 
inevitably concerned with assessing odds for successful performance (Das & Teng, 1998). By 
collaborating with other firms one firm does not have to bear the full costs and risks. 
Reduction of risk in alliances can be: 1) spreading the risk of a large project over more than 
one firm; 2) enabling product diversification and thus reducing market risk associated with 
being reliant on only one product; 3) enabling faster market entry and quicker establishment 
of a presence in the market, which in turn allows a more rapid pay back of investment; 4) cost 
subaddivity, i.e. the cost of the partnership is less than the cost of investment undertaken by 
each firm alone. In strategic alliances slack and expertise can be combined which lower costs 
(Glaister & Buckley 1996). 
 
Even if alliances can be a good option to reduce risk they also create risk. By forming an 
alliance a firm exposes itself to relational risk. Economic theory suggests that decision makers 
try to maximize utility. Firms are supposed to pursue their self- interest, even at the expense of 
the partner. Opportunistic behaviour may yield returns higher than fair play, so precautions 
should be taken to reduce this kind of risk. Shared equity holding can prevent opportunistic 
behaviour since interest is aligned and exploiting the venture would hurt both. Stringent 
control mechanisms and detailed contractual clauses may serve as counter weighting factors 
(Das & Teng 1998) 
 
Social opportunities 
 
Two factors that yield particularly high payoffs in alliances are when a firm is in a vulnerable 
strategic position, depending on the firm and the market, or when the firm has a strong social 
position. In an intensely competitive market a firm is vulnerable because of low margins, and 
a high speed of innovation leads to expensive product differentiation. To handle this and 
continuously be competitive a firm may need to seek allies to share costs and risks. The social 
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aspects are of significance to succeed in an alliance. Cooperation between firms runs 
smoother when managers have good personal relations that facilitate better governance, trust, 
and commitment are deepened. In an outward looking perspective a firm with good reputation 
and status signals trustworthiness for potential partners, thus facilitating cooperation. It is also 
important that a firm has the ability to be flexible in times of rapid change (Eisenhardt, Bird & 
Schoonhoven 1996).  
 
The three main reasons for alliance formation among dairy firms during the last four years are 
closely related to the firms’ overall strategies: 1) to promote international expansion; 2) to 
further penetrate home markets; and 3) to strengthen product portfolios (van der Krogt, 2003). 
 
 
4.4 The Resource-Based Theory 
 
The accounts in the preceding section mention repeatedly that the various types of strategic 
alliances involve the use of resources. The partners embark into an alliance with the aim of 
supplementing each other’s set of resources, be it market access, financial assets, R&D, 
product portfolios, etc. As the resources from the different partners are combined, both or all 
of them can strengthen their market positions and their competitiveness. Hence, the Resource-
Based Theory promises to be a valuable tool for the analyses to follow in the two subsequent 
chapters. After the theory is presented below, the last few sections of this chapter identify 
how the resource-based theory can be made use of.  
 
The resource-based (RB) theory has an inward-looking perspective. It sees firms as 
collections of resources, which is a bundle of potential productive services, possessed by a 
firm for a limited time. Only services, not resources, are inputs in production processes. By 
organizing and coordinating these resources in an optimal way a firm can create competitive 
advantages (Tsang 1997). According to the RB theory firms could utilize possessed resources 
by combining them with others to make profits. Social factors are of fundamental importance 
in cooperative arrangements. Personal good relations within and outside the firm create 
opportunities through trust and good connections between firms. Learning incentives may 
also initiate alliances. Specific skills of others cannot be bought or taught by imitation in most 
cases (Eisenhardt, Bird & Schoonhoven 1996). 
 
There is a strong link between resources and competitive advantage. Bounded rationality is a 
behavioural assumption in the sense that it is a question of how firms deal with the 
uncertainties using their organizational routines, not taking opportunism for granted. Hence 
the RB theory also considers social factors. This approach is more about needs and 
opportunities than efficiency (Eisenhardt, Bird & Schoonhoven 1996). 
 
Rather than being defined by the competitive environment the resource-based theory defines a 
firm by accumulated resources. If firms are to be competitive they have to be heterogeneous 
in terms of resources. The heterogeneity itself becomes a source of competitive advantage and 
is created through possessed resources that are scarce, not perfectly imitable or mobile or lack 
perfect substitutes. But even if this theory stresses internal aspects there is an important 
connection between the firm and the competitive environment. Substantial differences 
between firms’ profitability are better explained by differences in resources than if all firms’ 
existence and actions would be explained just by looking at their common industrial 
environment (Das & Teng 2000). Firms in different countries often imply a higher degree of 
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heterogeneity because countries differ in terms of political, social, cultural and economic 
conditions (Tsang 1997). 
 
Resources 
 
Depending on the characteristics of a resource different types of SAs are more or less suitable. 
Two possible reasons to form alliances are to acquire some other firms’ know-how, thereby 
obtaining resources, or to maintain one’s own know-how, retaining resources, while 
benefiting from other’s resources. If a firm choose to ally to get hold of some essential 
resource it should consider what alliance type that fit the particular objective the most. In 
mergers and acquisitions all resources possessed by the other firm will go along in the deal. 
All these resources may not be of importance or they may even be redundant. Less valuable 
resources are not always easy to dispose without taking a loss when they are not readily 
separable and have a certain degree of asset specificity. So, if not all resources of the acquired 
firm are valuable and wanted some other type of alliance should be applied (Das & Teng 
2000). 
 
Sometimes resources are not fully used. A firm can wait until the opportunity comes to utilize 
the resource optimally on its own, or it can ally with another firm. One example is excess 
capacity that can be used in private label production, or when research personnel do not have 
enough meaningful work at hand, they can be out-sourced to other firms. If relinquishing 
resources permanently is a better solution mergers or acquisitions is a good option while other 
alliances fit the purpose better if the currently under-utilized assets are to be kept internally in 
the long run. Regardless of the motive, decisions must be made after consideration of the 
opportunity costs of the resource. Strategic alliances should only be applied if the long-term 
value is higher than if resources should be kept internally, deployed or sold. After all, 
strategic alliances usually entail high governance costs and loss of organizational control (Das 
& Teng 2000). 
 
When choosing alliance type a firm must carefully consider what kind of resources it will 
provide. To get access to another firm’s resources it must be able to protect its own vulnerable 
property (Das & Teng 2000). 
 
Some suggest that resources, and their characteristics, held by a firm affect the likelihood of 
the company to form alliances. Apart from internationalisation, expensive and new 
technology, perceived environmental uncertainty or other reasons to ally the RB perspective 
sees resources as an important factor in these decisions. Firms that possess attractive 
resources are more likely to form alliances. A firm’s resource base can say a lot about self-
reliance. When competition is intense companies should employ alliances because their 
survival might be threatened due to resource stress. When working together, using each 
other’s resources and skills, firms could create something that differentiates them from other 
competitors, which they couldn’t have done working separately. Besides creation of synergies 
by pooling resources together a partner may provide new distribution channels or be a 
customer helping to send signals to the market that there is a need for the product (Das & 
Teng 2000).  
 
Categorisations of resources 
 
Without heterogeneity among firms there would be little incentive for alliances. 
Characteristics of resources that prevent homogeneity are imperfect mobility, imperfect 
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imitability and imperfect substitutability, all instrumental in the formation of strategic 
alliances. If a firm possesses resources that are scarce, imperfectly mobile, imperfectly 
imitable or imperfectly substitutable its homogeneity towards other firms is prevented. These 
kinds of characteristics are attached to those resources that cannot be imitated or bought for a 
fair price at the market. Causal ambiguity concerns the diffuse connection between 
competitive advantage and resources. Causal ambiguity depends on the degree of tacitness, 
complexity and specificity (Das & Teng 2000).  
 
Several characterizations of resources have been developed. They can be divided into tangible 
and intangible, and further into property-based and knowledge-based (Das & Teng 2000).  
 
Resources that are based on knowledge can be hard to protect against opportunistic behaviour 
in an alliance. These resources are intangible skills and know-how in a specific firm. These 
assets are vague and ambiguous and protected by information barriers, so they are not easy to 
imitate. Company culture and learning capacity are not particularly mobile while technology 
and managerial knowledge are quite easily acquired through the market. Knowledge-based 
resources are not as safe as property-based resources because the former are more vulnerable 
to unintended transfers (Das & Teng 2000).  
 
If a firm wants full protection it should only expose the resources that are patented or secured 
by other legal protections in the alliance, which often is the case with property-based 
resources. Property based resources are protected by patents, contracts and deeds of 
ownership, and the right to use them is solely held by the owner firm. Property-based 
resources can have different characteristics depending on type of asset. For example human 
resources are imperfectly mobile. Property-based resources that are easy to copy are 
inimitable because of patents, copyrights or contracts etc. (Das & Teng 2000).  
 
The choice of alliance type is also affected by the resource characteristics. Firms that mainly 
possess property-based resources, like financial assets, physical resources and human 
resources, can choose a collaboration type, such as an equity joint venture, where the close 
relationship does not jeopardize the resources because of the legal property rights. On the 
other hand, if the resources are mainly knowledge-based there is a risk involved in these kinds 
of alliances. It is hard to prevent the transfer of knowledge between firms when they are 
exposed to each other’s tacit skills in such an intimate entity as a joint venture. To avoid 
unwanted transfer of expertise firms could use more easily dissolvable contract-based 
alliances. Despite carefully considered choices concerning resources contributed, the 
performance of the collaboration is not a given success (Das & Teng 2000). 
 
Resources can be categorized into financial, technological, physical or managerial. What kind 
of resources a firm contributes can tell a lot about its objectives and orientation in an alliance. 
The companies involved in an alliance can have different orientation, such as controlling the 
management or securing technology. It is important to understand the direction of the partner 
because it will set its operational objectives based on its orientation. If these issues are cleared 
they will provide guidelines for managing. The firm who provides financial resources in an 
alliance naturally wants as good a return on investments as possible. If it does not trust its 
partner fully it would want to control decisions. This is achieved in a joint venture where the 
investing firm holds the largest share and therefore is in control over decisions. If trust is not a 
critical issue but the success of the performance is unsecured, the investing company should 
promote more easily dissolvable alliances. If a firm holds valuable technological resources 
they could utilize them by licensing them to several other firms, securing them with patents. 
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Physical resources can be protected by recurrent contracts. If the outcome of the alliance is 
not as good as the providing company had hoped it could withdraw. Or, it could try to get the 
partner to embed in the alliance good enough to prevent opportunistic behaviour. The duration 
of the alliance also affect trust. The longer the duration the more it is in both firms’ interest to 
keep good relations and work toward good results (Das & Teng 1998). 
 
The RB theory sets forward a number of assumptions, which are investigated further in 
section 6.1. 
 
· The RB theory suggests that there is a strong link between resources possessed by firms 
and competitive advantages. It defines a firm in terms of its accumulated resources, and 
heterogeneity in terms of resources is essential for competitiveness.  
· The RB theory explains how the purpose of the co-operation decides the type of alliance. 
Acquisitions and mergers are applied when all resources are of interest to obtain, and 
alliance types with less financial and organisational integration are applied when the 
cooperation has a more narrow purpose.  
· The RB theory suggests that a firm with attractive resources is more likely to form 
alliances than a firm with less attractive resources.  
 
 
4.5 Motives for strategic alliances: a resource base perspective 
 
The motives presented in Section 4.4 can be derived from the RB theory. Alliances are 
formed driven by motives that put possessed resources in focus, and by matching them 
benefits are created. Here some motives for SA by Tsang (1997) are presented. 
 
Creation of rents 
 
Rent earned can be defined as excess of the firm’s opportunity cost. When competition is 
intense rents are generally close to zero. Ricardian rents refer to rents generated by resources 
that produce services insufficient to meet the demand, thereby scarce. Ricardian rents are 
created because they make it possible to produce at lower cost, better products at a similar 
cost or better products at lower cost. A scarce resource in this sense may also be a 
combination of resources that separately are not particularly attractive. The significance of 
heterogeneity among firms in the RB perspective suggest that the higher the degree of 
heterogeneity the higher is the chance of forming alliances which would create rents. 
Heterogeneity increases as firms form alliances across countries. Implementation of strategies 
and coordination of control have become easier with the advance of information and 
communication technology.  
 
Expansion of resource usage 
 
Striving for long-run profits firms ought to expand whenever profitable opportunities exist. 
Some resources can be used simultaneously in virtually unlimited amounts, like computer 
programs or know-how, and therefore they can be put to use in other companies at the same 
time as they are retained within the firm. Increased usage can generate higher rents. R&D 
costs have skyrocketed the last years and this forces firms to amortize their fixed costs over a 
much bigger market. Many resources that require big investments are beneficial for a relative 
short time, which makes it essential to reap the most out of them before they become obsolete, 
to cover investments. Some resources, like technology and managerial skills are not that easy 
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to implement in other firms without guidance or adjustments. The more unfamiliar the other 
firm or industry are, the greater the loss in efficiency of the technology. When transferring 
tacit knowledge the transferor requires more human resources.  
 
Diversification of resource usage 
 
Even if a firm has all required resources to engage in a new project, there is no guarantee for 
success. Someone else may be the first to come up with a similar solution or the desired result 
may not be accomplished. Risk is always a critical issue when big investments are made and 
by spreading risk over one or several more firms in the same industry, risk can be reduced 
through diversification.  
 
Imitation of resources 
 
Imitating the alliance partner’s resources is another incentive to form alliances. Some 
resources are non tradable and therefore the only way to obtain them is through cooperation 
with the firm that possesses them. But even in intimate cooperation some resources are 
imperfectly imitable because of causal ambiguity. It is impossible to virtually identify the 
causal links between the resources and their capabilities to create certain products or services. 
The degree of tacit knowledge is high and capabilities are the result of a complex combination 
of physical, human and organizational resources. Ability to imitate is of course depending on 
the alliance type. The more intimate interactions the easier to understand the complex links 
that create the actual resource of another firm. This motive is closely associated with alliance 
instability. Secret imitation takes place without intention of letting the partner learn the tacit 
skills while open imitation occur when the firm that possesses the resource agrees to let the 
partner use the skills.  
 
One example of open imitation is in licensing, where the licenser agrees to teach and let the 
licensee use the technology under specific conditions. A determining factor for a firm to be 
able to learn and imitate others is its “absorptive capacity”. To have absorptive capacity 
means to “recognize the va lue of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial 
ends” (Tsang 1998, p 216) A firm with absorptive capacity has prior related knowledge, 
which is history-dependent, complementary capabilities, personnel who have training, 
experience and equipment and its own related resources.  
 
Disposal of resources 
 
Sometimes a firm needs to dispose some unit to focus on the core business. To do this in an 
efficient way some critical factors must be considered. When a decision is made to sell a unit, 
there is a risk of loss of human resources if personnel involved leave for other opportunities or 
it will lead to a decline in moral. Loyal customers and suppliers may turn to other business 
partners. If the unit for disposal is highly integrated with the corporate parent it can be hard to 
separate them without loss of value. If the unit is strongly linked to the corporate parent it can 
be difficult to convince potential buyers that the price is fair, especially if the resources 
involved are intangible. It may require special knowledge about internal operations to see the 
real value. And, if the unit for sale and the core-business units share facilities, systems, 
personnel and other administrative backup it reduces the value of the single unit.  
 
Maintaining the health of the business is important. The more integrated the units are the 
more likely that the selling process will be realized through an alliance formation. Through a 
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JV the resources of the for-sale-unit will gradually be integrated with the resources of the 
buying firm. If everything progresses smoothly the buyer will purchase the remaining shares 
held by its partner. (Tsang 1996) 
 
Resource - and risk management in the alliance-formation process 
 
By examining the type of resources a firm brings into an alliance its objective and orientation 
can be predicted. Different types of resources are also the origin of different kinds of risks. To 
get access to another firm’s resources through strategic alliances a firm has to expose some of 
its own resources, which are more or less vulnerable to unintended transfers, and therefore 
exposes itself to a risk. Risks in an SA can be divided into relational risk and performance 
risk. Relational risk refers to the probability that the partner does not comply with the spirit of 
the cooperation, like for instance opportunistic behaviour. Performance risk is concerned with 
the probability that the goals of the cooperation will not be satisfactory carried out. These two 
types of risk are independent because they have different sources. Relational risk is a factor of 
firm-firm interactions and performance risk is generated by external factors. So, despite from 
the fact that a high level of performance risk can create a sense of crisis and mitigate 
relational risk, the two risk types are not correlated (Das & Teng 1998).  
 
All these motives and drivers for strategic alliances open possibilities for firms to expand and 
innovate faster than if they should go through with all projects without cooperation. When a 
more dynamic business environment is created the pace of strategic alliance formations will 
reasonably increase. 
 
 
4.6 Strategic fit 
 
If a firm considers it having enough reasons to form an alliance it must be prepared to give it 
much time and patience. Cooperating with other firms, often competitors in horizontal 
formations, requires great management skills to work out a process through which both 
parties can achieve a common purpose and understand each other’s domains. Key individuals 
must be devoted to the project to be able to identify and take advantage of the opportunities 
when they come. Opportunistic behaviour from one part can be foreseen and avoided to some 
extent if managers are well prepared and aware of the risks and the need for barriers against 
unintended transfers (Das & Teng 2000).  
 
It is often better to align with companies of the same size and similar culture. A good balance 
in resources contributed and common objectives can prevent learning races and opportunistic 
behaviour. Goals ought to be compatible; the more the partners’ goals overlap the greater the 
benefits of the alliance. But, even if an alliance seems like a good option to strengthen a 
firm’s competitiveness, many things can go wrong since two competing firms have a lot of 
sources to conflict (Das & Teng 2000). Although partners don’t have a perfect fit, differences 
can be worked out as long as managers are aware of the potential problems and have a 
dynamic view of the partnership. Before any alliance is formed firms should evaluate strategic 
and organizational fit and decide if the cooperation is too complex to work out efficiently. 
Objectives set up when forming an alliance should regularly be compared with the 
performance (Douma et al. 2000). 
 
In the benefits of synergy and resource utilization, the costs for coordination and control must 
be calculated. These costs will be higher if the firms involved are dissimilar when it comes to 
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culture, strategies, management and technological systems. Strategic fit is important if the 
cooperation is going to work smoothly, and more time can be spent on the actual purpose than 
on discussing administrative issues. It also can prevent that one big firm out rules a small one. 
It is a good thing when strategic goals converge and competitive goals diverge (Das & Teng 
2000). 
 
 
4.7 Resource alignment 
 
Resources must be wisely aligned. Resources can be complementary, similar, and 
supplementary aligned to achieve economies of scale, risk sharing or market power etc. 
Complementary resources are different, not similar, and as one can understand 
complementing each other. Complementary resources are probably the best alternative when 
it makes the overall resource base stronger by non-redundancy.  
 
Surplus alignment can arise because of slack when similar resources are provided. Resources 
contributed to the alliance are in excess and not utilized fully in the accomplishment of the 
task. When resources are dissimilar and firms do not manage to integrate them properly they 
are wasteful. Wasteful and surplus resources may be difficult to avoid in an alliance because 
some resources are hard to separate. Sometimes a surplus of resources can be a good thing. It 
will reduce the constraints faced by the firms and through this prevent some potential 
conflicts. It can also ease decentralization of decisions. But, if the alignment is not a good fit 
and the collective strengths are not satisfactory, firms should either dissolve the alliance or 
make a good attempt to make it better. This will be up to the managers of the firms, who must 
carefully consider what kind of resources, they and their allies are contributing with, and how 
the resources are affecting the performance of the alliance (Das & Teng 2000). 
 
 
4.8 Resource bases in cooperatives versus investor-owned firms 
 
The preceding sections explain how formations of strategic alliances are dependent upon the 
set of resources that the alliance partners have and how these resources are linked to the 
requirements from the markets as well as the goals that the partners want to achieve through 
the alliances. The theoretical sources for these accounts seem, however, to be based on studies 
of investor-owned firms, being by far the most dominating type of business form. Hence, it is 
relevant to wonder if agricultural cooperatives differ in these respects: Are there any 
systematic differences between cooperatives and IOFs in terms of resources? Do the two 
organizational forms differ in terms when it comes to the type of market they serve? Are there 
any divergences concerning their market strategies, expressed as need for investments of 
various kinds, market orientation, etc?  
 
The answer to these questions is contingent upon what is understood as a cooperative firm. 
Many authors distinguish between different organisational structures for cooperatives. Nilsson 
& Björklund (2003), for example, identify three organisational models for cooperatives, 
working under open market conditions (and a fourth one, suitable for strictly regulated 
markets – this one is excluded from further discussions). The three are traditional 
cooperatives, Internal entrepreneurial cooperatives and External entrepreneurial cooperatives. 
Is should be underlined that these three consitute pure, theoretical constructs – real world 
cooperatives are most often a combination of the three. Table 4-1 summarises the discussion 
as well as a few other factors.  
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Table 4-1: Cooperative organizational models, characterized in terms of resource bases, strategies and 
market choice.  
Characteristics Cooperative organizational model 
 Traditional 
cooperatives 
Internal 
entrepreneurial 
cooperatives 
External 
entrepreneurial 
cooperatives 
Ownership Collectively by the 
membership 
Members/suppliers 
have individual 
ownership (tradable 
delivery rights) 
Collective owns part; 
External investors have 
individual ownership to 
the rest 
Financial resources 
per unit of produce 
Small Fairly limited Fairly large or large 
Market characteristics Large stable markets Small, dynamic market Large, dynamic market 
Top professional 
management 
Not absolutely 
necessary 
Yes Very much so 
Value-added products No Yes Yes 
R&D investments Very small Large Very large 
Strategy Cost leadership 
strategy 
Focus strategy Differentiation strategy 
Member role Supplier only Supplier and investor Supplier and eventually 
investor 
Member orientation Production orientation Market orientation Mostly market 
orientation 
Task of the cooperative Defensive Offensive Offensive 
Success factor Economies of scale 
(low costs, low prices) 
Economies of scope 
(streamlining) 
Economies of scale and 
scope (streamlining) 
Technology Well-known, simple Innovative Innovative, advanced 
Market signals from Raw product markets Raw product markets 
and financial market 
Financial market and 
raw product market 
 
Traditional cooperatives have a set of resources that make them adapting to an overall cost 
leadership strategy. This strategy is about producing at lower cost than competitors to be able 
to sell products cheaper and capture the price sensitive buyers. To succeed in keeping the 
cost-per-unit price down large scale production is necessary. The pace of product 
development is low and firms working by this strategy are large in number. For a cooperative 
to successfully apply a low-cost strategy it has to, except stimulate volumes, operate 
commercially- no unnecessary costs. Volume stimulating measures are applied only in cases 
where they lead to cost savings higher than the cost caused by volume stimulating measures.  
 
Internal entrepreneurial cooperatives are well-suited for a focus strategy. This implies 
becoming the preferred supplier to a smaller market segment. To accomplish this firms have 
to be able to produce at low cost, (low cost because of large-scale production is not an option 
here), or sell an attractive product to a less price sensitive market niche. The suppliers have to 
invest large amounts to acquire delivery rights in their cooperative to become members, but as 
these delivery rights can be sold or bought to a market price, the ownership becomes 
individualised. As owners to such rights members would want these to have as high value as 
possible. What becomes important is raw product price in the long run and members have 
incentives to invest in the cooperative society. Internal entrepreneurial cooperatives fit the 
focus strategy – when capital originates from members it will never grow large. 
 
External entrepreneurial cooperatives are adapted to follow a differentiation strategy. Firms 
following this strategy make products that differ from competitors’ products. Differentiated 
products need to have qualities good enough for consumers to pay a premium price. Large-
scale production is favourable but returns can be good even if costs are high. Most essential 
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are attractive products. Always having products that differ from competitors requires high 
speed of product development, which means large investments and extreme market 
orientation. To obtain the required financial strength, the cooperative invites external 
investors as co-owners, either to the cooperative society itself or (more probable) to one or 
several subsidiary firms. Investors require return on invested capital in forms of either yearly 
disbursements or as an increase in value. In either case the cooperatives capital base grows 
and incentives will be created in a commercially good way. Investors would never accept old-
fashioned cooperative ideology to curb profitability by operating over capacity and paying a 
higher raw product price than what would be economically justified.  
 
The four dairy processing firms that are presented in Chapter 3 and whose strategic alliance 
activities are investigated further in Chapter 5, differ as to organisational form. Danone is an 
investor-owned firm (IOF), while the three others are cooperatives. These three have, 
however, quite different cooperative organisational models. They represent the same three 
cooperative models that are presented above, and so, they have also different resource bases, 
different goals and different market opportunities, i.e., they can be expected to apply different 
policies when it comes to strategic alliances: 
 
· Arla Foods is a traditional cooperative, i.e., it is collectively financed and the governance 
is highly collective. An expression for the collective governance is that the cooperative 
applies the one member – one vote principle.  
· Also Campina is to some extent traditionally organised, but there are significant 
differences. One is that the members have very large individual investments in the 
cooperative; otherwise they are not allowed to deliver. These investments are, however, 
not exactly in the form of tradable delivery rights, but the effect is quite similar, as the 
members’ investments increase in value as the cooperative extends its capital base, and 
the exiting member will redeem an amount significantly larger than the one he or she 
invested. Likewise, as Campina has differentiated voting – more votes to members with 
larger deliveries – also the governance diverts from the traditional cooperative model. So, 
most of all, Campina resembles an internal entrepreneurial cooperative, but its capital 
base is considerable larger than is most often found in this type of cooperatives.  
· Friesland-Coberco runs its business operations within a subsidiary – Friesland Dairy 
Food Company – owned together with external co-owners. The shares of FDFC are 
floating at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. Hence, Friesland is characterised as an 
external entrepreneurial cooperative.  
 
Based on the accounts of Section 4.8, a number of expectations could be set forward:  
 
· Danone could be expected to involve mainly in acquisitions of other dairy processing 
firms, and so without any limitations as to country. Probably Danone is more interested in 
buying all the shares of these firms, otherwise large parts of them. Further, being an IOF, 
Danone would have advantages in doing business with value-added dairy products as well 
as non-dairy products, and not the least, products in the intersection between dairy and 
non-dairy.  
· Being a traditional cooperative, Arla Foods suffers from a limited capital base, and so, its 
alliance activities are more likely to have the form of mergers, collaborative agreements 
and the acquisition of minor shares. The base being Danish and Swedish dairy farmer, 
Arla Foods could be expected to expand in the neighbouring countries. It is unlikely that a 
dairy farmer owned business would expand into non-dairy operations. The strategy is due 
to be fairly conservative, due to the restrictions of a traditional cooperative.  
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· Campina’s members are due to be less risk aversive and more prone to invest in new 
businesses as they have much more individual ownership in their cooperative. Hence, 
Campina could be expected to expand into markets further away from the domestic 
market, as well as to invest larger amounts.  
· Friesland’s expected strategy would be the most offensive of the three cooperatives. The 
firm does not only have access to capital from external co-owners – these owners also 
provide signals to the cooperative from the capital market, and these signals mean that the 
firm must follow an aggressive and expansionist strategy, otherwise the investors will 
become dissatisfied with their capital returns.  
 
These hypotheses are investigated in the next chapter where a number of cases are presented – 
strategic alliance initiatives from each of the four dairy processors. Conclusions on them 
follow in Section 6.2.  
 
 
4.9 Conclusions  
 
The conclusions from the theoretic analyses are of three kinds. The first ones concern the 
concept of strategic alliances as well as the classification of these into six types. These types 
of alliances give the structure of the empirical investigation in the next chapter.  
 
Second, alliance formation is a consequence of the partners’ respective possession of 
resources, to be involved in the alliance project. When these resources are combined, they 
should fit the needs of the markets. Hence the resource-based theory provides valuable 
concepts, mainly the ones concerning the partners’ motives for involving their resources in 
the joint project, the degree of fit between the partners’ different sets of resources, and the 
types of resources invested in the alliance.  
 
Third, the possession of resources can be expected to differ significantly between firms with 
different organisational structures, and this is very important in the dairy industry, where 
farmer cooperatives have large market shares. Hence, a classification of cooperative 
organisational models may prove instrumental to understand the differences in alliance 
formation, as each model is characterised by quite different sets of resources.  
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5. Examples of strategic alliances 
 
5.1 Alliance types in the dairy industry 
 
Looking at alliances initiated by dairies during the last years one can identify differences 
between firms with different ownership structures. Like other IOFs, Danone has made several 
acquisitions and bought a significant number of shares in other firms. The co-operatives, on 
the other hand, seem to be more divergent, applying the whole range of alliance types. 
Licensing seems to be the less frequently used strategy in alliance activities, apart from 
Finnish Valio, which has utilized its Lactobacillus GG in selling licenses to several firms.  
 
In this chapter some strategic alliances initiated by Arla Foods, Danone, Friesland Coberco 
and Campina are presented. This is meant to illustrate the theoretical discussions in the 
preceding chapter. Even though the case descriptions are not representative for the entirety of 
strategic alliances in the dairy industry, they can still serve as a basis for the discussion that is 
conducted in Chapter 6. In analysing how the strategies differ between the firms, the 
analytical toolbox consists of three theoretical constructs: motives (cf. Sections 4.3 and 4.5), 
resources (Section 4.7) and strategic fit (Section 4.6). 
 
An overview of the strategic alliances in the European dairy industry is provided in Table 5-1. 
The presentation in this chapter covers only a selection of these, enough to illustrate the 
various types of alliances. The data was collected mainly through search at the Internet, but 
also a personal interview as well as literature studies.  
 
Table 5-1: Number of alliances by type made by four firms in the European dairy industry from 1998-
2002 (Source: Dirk van der Krogt, pers. communication, 2003) 
Number of alliances by type  Firm 
Mergers Acquisi-
tions 
Joint 
ventures 
Shares Co-op. 
agreemen
t 
Licensing 
Arla Foods  3 1 8 3 2 2 
Friesland Coberco  2 7 - 3 - - 
Campina  2 7 1 2 1 - 
Danone  - 5 1 12 (1) - 
 
 
5.2 Mergers  
 
Arla – MD Foods (2000). Swedish Arla and Danish MD Foods initiated a cross border merger 
between the two dairy cooperatives in 2000. Arla Foods is now one of Europe’s largest 
dairies. Despite of the modest size of the home markets, Arla Foods is internationally 
competitive. The main reason for the merger was consolidation and concentration in retail and 
among competing dairies on the European market. Together the two can successfully meet 
demands from international customers on product development, marketing and processing 
(www.arlafoods.com). After the merger a harmonizing plan was worked out to make sure that 
all members would operate under equal conditions in economic matters. At the same time 
cultural differences between the countries are respected 
(www.arlafoods.se/press/artikel.asp?more=787&firstYear=1997&firstMonth=9&y1=2002&m
1=alla&fras= 2003-09-26). The merger capitalizes on former MD Foods’ considerable 
competencies within exports and Arla’s strong brand position in the Nordic countries as well 
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as it strong balance sheet 
(http://www.arlafoods.com/412567A1004C695D/alldocs/Q1A2ADA130637BD53C1256B79
00455C76!Open&IC022D01Cat06&& 2003-11-18).  
 
Looking at Danone’s alliance formations the last five years it is obvious that mergers are not 
part of its strategy. Shares and acquisitions are the alliance types most frequently applied by 
this firm. 
 
Friesland Dairy Foods – Coberco (1997). A large merger between four dairy cooperatives 
took place in 1997, when Dutch Coberco, Friesland Dairy Foods, Twee Provinciën and De 
Zuid-Oost-Hoek joined forces. The merger capitalized on developments in the dairy market 
(www.fcdf.nl/content_engels/over_fcdf/main-popup.asp?fd=6 2003-09-23): 
 
· Reduction in state support; 
· Increasing importance of the European market; 
· Fiercer competition in the European market; 
· Increasing economies of scale and concentration of operations on both the demand and 
retail sides; 
· Continued pressure in the milk price paid to members. 
 
Friesland and Coberco were complementing each other’s market coverage well. Friesland had 
better finances and Coberco was lagging behind in developments but had a more modern 
structure that Friesland’s farmers could benefit from. When uniting the firms a whole new 
corporate culture was created (Jos ver Woort, pers. communication 2003)  
 
In the year of 2000 the representatives of the dairy co-op Milchwerke Köln/Wuppertal e.G. 
(MKW) approved the integration with Dutch Campina Melkunie, as a continuation of the JV 
established in 1997. This cross-border co-operative makes it possible for Campina to realize 
its strategy towards international growth and its focus on value-added products. The merger 
strengthens Campina’s position in both the German and the Dutch market. MKW brought in 
its operational activities and Campina achieved capital. By merging with MKW Campina 
Melkunie increased its share in Tuffi Campina Emzett GmbH to 79%. The result from this 
merger will be one of Europe’s largest dairy co-operatives and it will be carried out in three 
steps, starting in January 2001 and fulfilled in January 2007 (Bekkum 2001). 
 
 
5.3 Acquisitions  
 
Arla Foods and Skånemejerier commonly owned Lindals, running dairy operations in Poland, 
before the complete takeover by Arla Foods in year 2000. The reason for this take-over is that 
Arla Foods sees Lindals and Poland as an integrated part of the northern European market, 
and Skånemejerier has decided to focus on the Nordic countries 
(http://www.arlafoods.se/press/artikel.asp?more=376&firstYear=1997&firstMonth=9&y1=20
00&m1=7&fras= 2003-09-18). 
 
Danone – Shape/Uniq Plc (2002). Danone acquired Uniq Plc’s Shape branded fresh dairy 
products portfolio. Shape is the number-two brand in the UK in the low fat fresh dairy 
segment. Through this acquisition Group Danone strengthened its market share in fresh dairy 
products and accelerated its focused growth strategy 
(http://www.danonegroup.com/finance/index_finance.html 2003-09-26). Uniq needed the 
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financial means to reduce borrowings. When the acquisition is fully completed the factory 
where Uniq produced Shape yogurt will be closed and Uniq will sell it separately, since it was 
operating at below an economical scale. After disposing the yogurt business Uniq will be able 
to focus on its core activities in the European chilled convenience food sector 
(http://www.uniqplc.com/Uniqplc/infopool.nsf/HTML/4B05B615C34A027C80256C69004E
D2B2 2003-09-26). 
 
In 2001 Friesland Coberco bought the Nutricia Dairy & Drinks Group, a division of Royal 
Numico N.V. The group consists of several dairies in the Netherlands, Germany, England, 
Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic and Slovakia. Purchasing Nutricia is part of Friesland 
Coberco’s strategy to improve the quality of sales and profitability by enlarging the segment 
of distinguished branded products within the total sales. Strong brands combined with an 
excellent addition to their present assortment for supermarkets and for the strongly growing 
out–of-home market Nutricia can strengthen Friesland Coberco in fast developing dairy 
markets in Central Europe. Disposal of Nutricia was part of Numico’s strategy to focus on its 
core business. Anticipating the transfer, the Nutricia operated as a separate entity, both legally 
and managerially. Nutricia will operate as a separate entity within the Friesland Coberco 
organization (www.fcdf.nl/content_engels/nieuws/news-popup.asp?id=193 2003-09-23). 
According to Jos ver Voort (pers. communication, 2003) a lot of effort was made to adjust the 
firms´ culture to fit Friesland Coberco.  
 
Campina UK acquired Superlife‘s flavoured milk brand with 20-years’ heritages, in 2002. 
Yazoo, the UK’s number one flavoured milk brand, is already owned by Campina and the 
purchase of Superlife which holds 5,3% home market share, will strengthen Campina’s 
position in the UK. Yazoo has its strong position in retail and Superlife has strong sales 
through foodservice customers, an area which Campina intends to exploit further 
(http://www.campina.com/default.asp?selected=camcom.engels.newspress.pressrelea|1&l=en
&page=2&selectedItem=camcom.engels.newspress.pressrelea.PBSuperlif 2003-09-23). 
 
 
5.4 Joint Ventures 
 
In 2001 Arla Foods and the New Zeeland dairy Fonterra created a JV owned by Arla Foods 
to 75% to improve their positions in the highly competitive yellow fats market. The JV 
involved establishing a business responsible for marketing and distributing the brands in the 
British Isles, and developing new products for the yellow fats and spreads markets. 
(Fonterra’s annual report 2001/02) Distribution, marketing and sales of the strong brands 
Lurpak (Arla Foods) and Anchor (Fonterra) will be more effective through the JV. Lurpak is 
the second biggest and Anchor third in sales volume in the butter category. Market shares are 
increasing (Arla Foods’ annual report 2001/02).  
 
Group Danone has signed a partnership agreement with Egyptian Rachid group, in 2001, to 
expand its three core businesses, fresh dairy products, biscuits and beverages. In the Near and 
Middle East region, Rachid is one of the main market players for consumer goods. The plan 
with this JV, in which Danone initially holds 51% interest, is that it will expand on a regional 
basis through acquisitions and greenfield projects. Danone has strategic interests in this 
region. With about 65 million inhabitants, of whom 35% is below 15 years old, this market 
offers a strong growth potential (http://www.danonegroup.com/finance/index_finance.html 
2003-09-18). 
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Campina – Tuffi Campina Emzett (2000). In the year of 2000 a JV was initiated between 
Campina (50%), MKW (29%) and BMG (21%). Tuffi Campina started to enlarge its activities 
to the Eastern part of Germany with the merger of Tuffi Campina (Cologne, in the west) and 
Emzett (Berlin). Campina was already present in the south (Heilbronn) (Bekkum 2001).  
 
 
5.5 Shares 
 
Arla Foods bought a share of interest in Swedish Kron Ost in the year of 2000 (2002?), to 
which Arla Foods is a supplier. Kron Ost produces and packs cheese and is a good 
complement to Arla Foods other activities. The strength in this firm is its great knowledge 
about cheese and its close individual arrangements with customers. Kron Ost has around 80 
employees and its activities will continue as before 
(http://www.arlafoods.se/press/artikel.asp?more=673&firstYear=1997&firstMonth=9&y1=20
02&m1=2&fras= 2003-09-18). 
 
Danone – Stonyfield (2001). Group Danone purchased initially 40% holding in US Stonyfield 
Farm in the year of 2001. Under the agreement Danone will have an opportunity to acquire a 
majority holding in 2004. Stonyfield Farm is the fastest-growing yogurt company and the 
fourth largest yogurt brand in the US. This American firm is a leader in organics, natural 
nutrition and corporate and environmental responsibility. Both firms will remain 
autonomously managed. Danone will build upon and expand Stonyfield’s leadership in the 
US natural and organic yogurt segment, as it will provide pivotal assistance in terms of 
manufacturing, purchasing, logistics and other efficiencies. Compatible missions are both 
environmental responsibility and the health and nutrition concept 
(http://www.danonegroup.com/finance/index_finance.htm 2003-09-18). 
 
Friesland Coberco – Napolact (2002). In 2002 Friesland Romania, a subsidiary of Friesland 
Coberco Dairy Foods, made a public offer for shares in Napolact S.A. Napolact operates in 
Romania and produces a wide range of dairy products which it sells on the Romanian market 
of which it has a substantial market share. Beside the strong home market position Napolact 
also exports special cheese types. Friesland Romania made this strategic step as a completion 
of three previous acquisitions that have made the firm one of the leading dairy players on the 
Romanian market in terms of product range as well as location 
(http://www.fcdf.com/content_engels/index.html 2003-09-23). 
 
In 1999 Campina bought a 53% share in Emzett (Berlin). The year after the German activities 
were regrouped in a new company, Tuffi Campina Emzett, with shares held by Campina 
(50%), MKW (29%) and BMG (21%) (Bekkum 2001). 
 
 
5.6 Co-operative agreements 
 
In 2002 Arla Foods and Swedish Skånemejerier signed a contract with the substance that 
Skånemejerier is going to produce whey protein concentrate for Arla Foods. Arla Foods has a 
big export market for advanced whey products and sees this co-operation as an opportunity to 
further strengthening this position 
(http://www.arlafoods.se/press/artikel.asp?more=750&firstYear=1997&firstMonth=9&y1=20
02&m1=9&fras= 2003-09-18). 
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Danone purchased a minority stake in Shanghai Bright Dairy in the year of 2000. Shanghai 
Bright Dairy is a leading dairy firm in China and the alliance enables Danone and Shanghai 
Bright Dairy to extend their market coverage. The two firms join forces in yogurt and dairy-
desserts in China aiming at bringing Danone’s activities together with those of Shanghai 
Bright Dairy (http://www.danonegroup.com/finance/index_finance.html 2003-09-23).  
 
Veghel, The Nederlands-DMV International, a division of Campina, entered into an 
agreement with AgriMark (2001), a dairy cooperative in the USA, for the production of 
lactoferrin. DMV will control the operations at the AgriMark plant, and will purchase all 
lactoferrin produced. Ingredients for the food, nutritional and pharmaceutical industries are 
one of the three strategic growth areas of Campina. To be able to meet the demand, it needed 
to larger production capacity. This agreement further expands DMV’s capacity for lactoferrin, 
anticipating market development (www.lfplus.com 2003-11-26).  
 
 
5.7 Licensing 
 
One firm that has used this type of alliance type to exploit a patented resource is Finnish 
Valio. Valio’s Lactobacillus GG was first identified in 1983 and functions as a protection 
against GI infections and imbalances in the body. Aware of the value of this discovery Valio 
acquired a worldwide exclusive license in 1987. The first LGG product was launched in 1990 
and today the firm offers a wide range of LGG products and grants LGG rights to other firms 
under sublicense agreements in more than 30 countries 
(http://www.valio.fi/channels/konserni/eng/tanaan/unnamed/unnamed_4/unnamed_7.html 
2003-10-15).  
 
The case descriptions in this chapter contain a large number of variables that explain why 
dairy firms launch alliances of various kinds, what the alliances were meant to achieve and 
how they were formed. These issues are discussed in the following chapter.  
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6. Discussion and conclusions 
 
6.1 Alliances as a consequence of partners ’ resources 
 
The theoretical discussion (Chapter 4) concludes with the observation that three constructs 
play a decisive role for the formation of strategic alliances – the partners’ motives for 
investing resources in an alliance project, the degree of strategic fit obtained between the 
partners’ respective set of resources, and the type of resources involved in the alliance. On the 
basis of the empirical material presented in Chapter 5 Table 6-1 is constructed. The table 
hence constitutes an abstract summary of all the cases in the six categories of alliances.  
 
Some of the motives mentioned in Chapter 4 are not accounted for in the table, as these were 
not identified in the cases. This does not necessarily mean that those motives do not exist – 
only that they have not been stated by the allying partners. Actually, only a few of the motives 
presented in Chapter 4 are represented. Generally international expansion and further 
penetration on markets where the firms are already present seem to be the most common 
motives. 
 
The table includes the cases mentioned in the preceding chapter, to illustrate the conclusions. 
These require a number of comments: All three cooperatives included in this study have 
applied mergers. Danone, on the contrary, has not used this type of alliance in its growth 
strategy. The RB theory explains how the purpose of the cooperation decides the type of 
alliance. Acquisitions and mergers are applied when all resources are of interest to obtain, and 
alliance types with less financial and organisational integration are applied when the 
cooperation has a more narrow purpose. This and financial structure seem to decide the type 
of alliance. There is no doubt that Danone is a very attractive firm to ally with, considering its 
alliance formation activities the last years, which could entail that if enough financial means 
is available, firms rather acquire than merge. All these observations are in line with the 
propositions put forward in Section 4.4, on the basis of the analyses of the Resource-Based 
Theory.  
 
Turning to the number of acquisitions made by the four firms all but Arla Foods have 
completed several. Danone, Friesland Coberco and Campina all have capacity to raise 
necessary financial means to go through with acquisitions because of their favourable 
financial structures. Danone and Friesland Coberco can raise funds from external investors, 
and Campina from its members. Firms use their prerequisites for different alliance formation 
activities to achieve competitiveness. But is the choice between acquisitions and mergers 
solely a question of strategy, or is it access to money? 
 
Arla Foods has limited chances to raise necessary financial means to acquire or purchase large 
shares in other firms because it has very little member allocated equity and no non-member 
allocated equity capital. Danone is the one firm with biggest potential to acquire and buy large 
shares because of external investors and shares floating on the stock market. The difference 
between Arla Foods and Danone is very clear while differences among the three cooperatives 
in the study need more scrutiny (followed in the next section). 
 
The RB theory suggests that a firm with attractive resources is more likely to form alliances. 
Looking at the number of alliances formed by the four firms Arla Foods outnumbers the 
others.  
 39 
Table 6-1: Explanations to choice of strategic alliance types 
Variable Alliance 
type Motive Strategic fit Resource 
Merger 
 
Obtain scale advantages, utilize physical 
resources, create synergies, share risk, share 
cost, create bigger capital bases, and 
strengthen position toward customers and 
competitors. 
Arla – MD Foods 2000 
Friesland – Coberco 1997 
Campina – MKW 2000 
Total integration requires 
good fit. Both parts in control.
Compatible cultures, 
organization models and 
compatible goals are 
important. 
Brand position- export 
competence. 
Finances – modern 
structure. 
Brand pos. – Operational 
activities and capital. 
Market position, strong 
brands, good finances etc. 
Compatible competences 
and resources. 
 
Mergers have been 
applied by all three 
cooperatives, but not by 
Danone. Financial means 
not necessarily a key 
resource. 
Acquisi-
tion 
Obtain scale advantages, utilize physical 
resources, share risk, share cost, and create 
bigger capital bases. International 
expansion, home market expansion, and 
take control over competitors. 
Arla Foods – Skånemejerier 
2000 
Danone – Shape/Uniq Plc 
2002 
Friesland Coberco – Nutricia 
Dairy & Drinks 2001 
Campina – Superlife 2002 
Total integration requires 
good fit. Acquirer in control.  
Acquires objects with 
concepts that fit the firm 
strategy. 
Finances – Market 
position. 
Finances – Market 
position. 
Finances – Market 
position, strong brands. 
Finances – Market 
position, strong brands 
Financial capital, ability 
to take some risk.  
Danone, Campina & 
Friesland Coberco have 
done several acquisitions. 
They al have capacity to 
raise necessary financial 
means. 
Joint 
Venture 
Obtain scale effects and international 
expansion, create synergies, and to 
strengthen position toward customers and 
competitors. 
Arla Foods – Fonterra 2001 
Danone – Rachid 2001 
Campina – Tuffi Emzett 2000
Strategic fit for the resources 
involved in JV is important. 
Separate legal entity. Medium 
integration. Control allocated 
after contract and equity 
share.  
Parent firms should not be 
competitors. 
Synergies in distribution, 
marketing & sales. 
Strong brands-market 
position. 
Complementing markets. 
Production sites, good 
market position, strong 
brands, good management 
skills etc. 
Arla Foods dominates this 
category. Arla Foods has 
capitalized on its market 
position and competence 
to successfully expand 
through JV’s. 
Share A step toward a complete take-over, 
influence in decisions and thereby affect 
ones own market situation. 
Arla Foods – Kron Ost 2000 
Danone – Stonyfield Farms 
2001 
Friesland Coberco – Napolact 
2002 
Campina – Emzett 1999 
Important if the purchasing 
firm buys a significant share. 
Can be a step toward 
complete take over. Level of 
integration is low, (depending 
of the size of the share). 
Control if >50% of shares. 
Finances- Competence 
Finances- Market position 
& strong brands 
Finances- Market position 
Finances- Market position
Financial capital, ability 
to take some risk. 
Danone strongly 
dominates the appliance 
of shares. 
Danone has the most 
favourable financial 
structure to raise capital to 
buy shares.  
Co-
operative 
agreement 
Strengthen market position, international 
expansion, and sale and synergy effects. 
Arla Foods – Skånemejerier 
2002 
Danone – Shanghai Bright 
Dairy 2000 
Campina – Agrimark 2001 
Strategic fit is not of 
immediate importance but for 
the purpose of the alliance 
that is quite narrow. 
Level of integration is low.  
Strong export market 
position- Production 
capacity. Synergies 
Strong export market 
position- Production 
capacity 
Prod capacity, market 
position with growth 
potential etc. 
None of the four firms 
apply co-operative 
agreements very often. 
Here a good match is 
more important. 
Licensing Narrow purpose. Achieve standardization 
of a patented product, utilize innovative 
product optimally or overcome weaknesses 
without having to develop the solution. 
Valio Level of integration is low.  
 
Attractive product – 
Production possibilities & 
market. 
Attractive patented 
product, market position, 
spared capacity etc. 
Requires a genuine 
attractive product that can 
be patented. 
 40 
Motives found in the cases support the theory. From a resource-based perspective one can 
observe that all alliances are formed to align different kinds of resources. A good match of 
resources means good strategic fit, and complementing resource alignment seems to be 
frequently occurring. This generates heterogeneity among firms’ resources. Depending on 
what kind of resources the firms have different kinds of collaboration to obtain competitive 
advantages occur. Arla Foods has capitalized on its market position, strong brands and 
competence, while Danone has used its capacity to raise financial means to go through with 
acquisitions and buy shares.  
 
The motives for acquisitions and mergers are quite similar, in fact those motives go for almost 
any type of alliance, but the immediate importance of something must stand in proportion to 
resource and financial integration. So, from mergers and acquisitions to co-operative and 
licensing agreements a drop-of of motives can be observed as the level of resource and 
financial integration decreases. Even if motives are similar some firms choose acquisitions 
and some choose mergers. One obvious difference is available financial capital.  
 
In the mergers resources are complementarily aligned to create opportunities for growth. In 
acquisitions and shares, it is more of a one-way seeking for attractive resources where one 
firm purchases other firms’ resources. In JVs synergies are made by aligning resources within 
a specific purpose. Co-operative agreements and licensing have more narrow purposes and are 
applied when the reason for the partnership is not strong enough to create full integration. 
 
 
6.2 Alliances as a consequence of resources in organisational models 
 
Arla Foods is a traditional cooperative but follows a strategy that is better suited for other 
forms of organisational structures. Its objective within its strategic alliance activities is more 
an offensive desire to achieve competitive advantages than a defensive instinct to survive. 
According to theory (Section 4.8), Arla Foods can be expected to have no value-added 
products, insignificant amounts invested in R&D, expand in the neighbouring countries and to 
apply the cost leadership strategy. In real world Arla Foods has a wide range of sophisticated 
value-added products, invests large amounts of money in R&D to be able to keep up its 
differentiating strategy and has a multinational approach reaching over all five continents.  
 
When it comes to alliance formation Arla Foods has a limited capital base, and mergers, 
shares and JVs are the most frequently applied alliance types. Arla Foods is the one firm in 
this study that has formed the most alliances, and it has used all six types.  
 
Danone is an IOF that can be expected to involve mainly in acquisitions and shares and grow 
through value-added dairy products and non-dairy products. This assumptions mirror reality 
quite well. Alliances formed between Danone and other dairy firms are mainly shares and 
several acquisitions. Financial means are raised through external investors. 
 
Campina’s cooperative organisational model set up presumptions that agree well with the real 
case. Its members are less risk aversive and more prone to invest in new businesses than 
members in traditional cooperatives like Arla Foods. The dominating alliance type applied is 
acquisitions. But according to theory an internal entrepreneurial cooperative is supposed to 
operate on small dynamic markets with a focus strategy while Campina operates 
multinationally, following a differentiation strategy. 
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As an external entrepreneurial cooperative Friesland Coberco can be expected to follow the 
most offensive strategy of the cooperatives in this study. Acquisitions are the most frequently 
formed alliance type in Friesland Coberco’s multinational approach, but according to the 
number of alliances formed, and the type of alliances formed, during the last four years it has 
not appeared more offensive than Campina. Campina and Friesland Coberco have a very 
similar pattern in their alliance formations. 
 
In fact all three cooperatives have more similar patterns concerning market characteristics, 
strategy, management, R&D investments, value-added products and innovative technology, 
than what could be expected from the general characteristics for the different cooperative 
organisation forms, all tending to operate like external entrepreneurial cooperatives.  
 
The member governance structures in these co-operatives may have implications for decision-
making concerning strategic alliances. The structures differ among the three firms. The 
internal governance diverge in terms of rights and responsibilities of the various decision-
making bodies, and of the membership itself. Arla Foods and Friesland Coberco have 
democratic voting procedures with one vote per member while Campina uses a system with 
five votes per member up to 100,000 kg of milk, with one additional vote for every next 
20,000 kg with a maximum of 25 votes. Everything else being equal, one may expect co-
operatives with one vote per member to be more conservative in their investment decisions 
than co-operatives with differentiated voting rights.  
 
When comparing cooperatives in terms of investment relationship, an important concept is 
that of allocated capital as opposed to collective capital. The risk-bearing capital structure of 
Arla Foods differs from the two other cooperatives in this study, as it does not have any 
member allocated non-equity or non-member allocated non-equity. (Bekkum 2001, p 207) 
More important is that the share of member allocated equity in Arla Foods is considerably 
smaller than in Campina and Friesland Coberco. To give members incentives to invest in their 
cooperative proper rewards must be provided. Only when capital is allocated this is possible. 
If investments are stable during the period of membership a perpetually higher milk price can 
reflect a return to members, but as soon as the investment intensity increases, incentives to 
invest are necessary. A high milk price during the membership period does not stimulate 
investments; additionally the member- investor must be able to capture the real value increase 
of the firm since this would otherwise fall into the hands of the firm at a presumable sell-out 
of the farm. Capture of real value may be attained by making financial instruments freely 
tradable, either internally or externally (Friesland Coberco), or by means of administrative 
appreciation (Campina), or through bonus share issues (Bekkum 2001, pp 124).  
 
In most European dairy cooperatives the share of unallocated capital ranges between 40 and 
60% (49.9% average). In Arla Foods this share is 85.1%. Member allocated risk-bearing 
capital averages 33.5% while Arla Foods only has 12.7%. Campina and Friesland Coberco 
did not have any allocated capital before they found themselves in a situation forced to alter 
the capital structure to raise capital for investments. Today both Campina, (39.6%), and 
Friesland Coberco, (31.4%), are close to average (Bekkum 2001, pp 127).  
 
Looking at alliances formed among European dairies the far most important resource seems to 
be financial resources. Differences found in alliance activities among IOFs and cooperatives 
and between cooperatives with different organizational forms have its most apparent 
explanation in divergent capital structures. If a firm had sufficient capital and the suitable 
capital structure to invest in acquisitions and shares rather than mergers, joint ventures and 
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cooperative agreements, it probably would. Anyhow, if one competitor has a larger range of 
options available than another firm, the first one will win in the competitive game. 
Cooperatives with no external entrepreneurial capital, like Arla Foods, have not many options 
but to grow through alliances that do not require much capital. Obtaining more financial 
means is difficult for a cooperative that is traditionally organised and wants to remain so.  
 
According to van Bekkum (2001) Arla Foods’ situation is untenable. His study points out that 
differentiation strategies work best in combina tion with entrepreneurial organization qualities, 
which is lacking in Arla Foods. When farmers’ profitability is decreasing members do not 
think they can afford cooperative ideologies, which lead to investment incentive problems. 
Another conclusion in the study concerns firms with a high level of horizontal integration; the 
bigger the firms are the more individualized structure they tend to have. With increasing size 
of a firm heterogeneity among members increase, which gives a stronger reason to treat them 
differently. The study suggests that Arla Foods should change strategy when competition 
becomes intensified, otherwise it will be hard to motivate members to contribute to finance. 
Bringing in external partie s to invest in the value-added business is Bekkum’s solution, which 
would require individualization in Arla Foods primary business units to reach sufficient 
market orientation.  
 
If Arla Foods wishes to proceed with its offensive alliance making strategy, thereby achieving 
competitive advantages, there are two options, both of which, however, would mean radical 
changes in the cooperative character. One is that the cooperative invites external financiers to 
own part of its subsidiaries, and the other one is that external investors buy B-shares in the 
cooperative society. In both cases there is a risk that the investors have little trust in the 
cooperative, and thus, they are hesitant to invest large amounts. They may, often rightfully, 
expect that the cooperative may reduce the profits by paying high milk prices to the farmers.  
 
In Arla Foods the board of directors is appointed by the rule one-member one-vote. Hence, 
smaller farmers carry greater weight than larger and more commercially oriented farmers 
since the former outnumber the latter. A board of directors elected this way is likely to be 
more risk averse, also when it decides about strategic alliances, acquisitions and shares are 
more precarious than mergers and co-operative agreements. In cooperatives like Friesland 
Coberco (which also practices the one member one vote system) and Campina, that has 
external investors whose interests and demand for return on invested capital must be 
considered, decisions tend to be less risk aversive. Maybe this is why Friesland Coberco and 
Campina have initiated more acquisitions and less JVs than Arla Foods. 
 
Other important resources that make a firm an attractive partner are market position and 
competence. Arla Foods has managed to keep its market position and capitalizes on its market 
dominance in the Nordic countries. Arla Foods has so far managed to grow considerably as a 
result of successful mergers and JVs the last four years.  
 
All motives driving strategic alliance activities forward create a more dynamic business 
environment for dairy firms. As firms form alliances new combinations of resources arise and 
create synergies, decreased risk enables bigger and more expensive projects and R&D, which 
creates a faster pace of innovation, and so on. All these factors affect the competitive climate. 
The top 15 dairies in Europe have initiated more than 200 alliances the last four years shaking 
and demodulating the market, which raise challenges that reasonably will generate an even 
faster pace of alliance formation in the future.  
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